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ABSTRACT

Intermodal shipping containers entering the United States provide an avenue to
smuggle unsecured or stolen special nuclear material (SNM). The only direct
method fielded to indicate the presence of SNM is by passive photon/neutron
radiation detection. Active interrogation using neutral particle beams to induce
fission in SNM is a method under consideration. One by-product of fission is the
creation of fragments that undergo radioactive decay over a time period on the
order of tens of seconds after the initial event. The “delayed” gamma-rays
emitted from these fragments over this period are considered a hallmark for the

vii

presence of SNM. A fundamental model is developed using homogenized cargos
with a SNM target embedded at the center and computationally interrogated
using simultaneous neutron and photon beams. Findings from analysis of the
delayed gamma emissions from these experiments are intended to mitigate the
effects of poor quality information about the composition and disposition of
suspect cargo before examination in an active interrogation portal.
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1

INTRODUCTION

I.

Foreword

A.

Special Nuclear Materials

The formal ushering in of the Atomic Age began on July 16, 1945 with the Trinity
test in the high desert of New Mexico and concluded with the destruction of the
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan less than one month later. Isotopes of
two elements hitherto unknown to the general population, accompanied by
astounding engineering prowess, were each used as key ingredients to capstone
the Second World War. Uranium-235 and plutonium-239 are now widely
recognized as valuable materials for use in both power generation and as
weapon components. This dual nature has made the production and/or
enrichment of these isotopes a necessary and closely guarded process. For
approximately 50 years, a delicate balance had been maintained to control their
proliferation while at the same time assisting responsible nations in generating
energy from these materials. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the onset of
the “War on Terror” have changed the nature of this balance with the revelation
of poorly controlled stockpiles of both isotopes and an unremitting pursuit of raw
materials and technology by rogue states to create their own weapons.
Monitoring inventories and tracking the movements of these very “special”
materials has now become a science and engineering challenge of its own.

2

B.

Intermodal Shipping Containers

Nearly one million intermodal shipping containers enter the United States per
month by sea (USDOT, 2009). These containers can be used to smuggle elicit or
illegal materials, animals, or people into (or out of) the country and may include
unsecured or stolen special nuclear material (Lichtenwald et al., 2009). Every
container cannot be comprehensively examined due to the impact on the speed
of commerce. As a result, a complex scheme to identify containers for intensive
scrutiny is in place (Kelly, 2007). These layers of defense are built around
various factors including gathered intelligence from manifests, x-ray inspection,
portal monitoring and cursory physical examination. If the container triggers
additional interest, it may be moved to a Customs exam site for a more extensive
inspection, including complete unloading. The only direct method available to
indicate the possible presence of special nuclear material (SNM) is through
passive photon/neutron detection of the comparatively weak signals produced by
natural radioactive decay. These decay signatures can be shielded with relative
ease and may allow small quantities (< 1 kg) to pass undetected (Myers, et al.,
2004).
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C.

Active Interrogation

The catastrophic consequences of reprobate weapon use has driven research
into active approaches that induce nuclear reactions, namely fission, in SNM and
then attempt to detect the unique particle signatures produced from the events.
Initially, neutron beams alone were considered, but the combination of cargo
beam attenuation and neutron activation are problematic (Slaughter et al., 2007a;
Pruett et al., 2005). The dual-beam active interrogation concept applies both
neutrons and gamma-rays to irradiate containers simultaneously and takes
advantage of the penetrating ability of photons in hydrogenous materials to
produce photofission events.

II.

Hypothesis and Chronological Aims

A.

Hypothesis

Interrogating a suspect shipping container for special nuclear material with both
neutron and photon beams at appropriate energies is superior to neutron beam
interrogation alone.

B.

Chronological Aims

1. Develop a fundamental container model to accommodate combinations of
low, medium and high density homogenized materials as surrogate cargo
using an SNM test object of practical composition.
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2. Demonstrate that the application of an additional photon beam yields a useful
signal increase from photofission as opposed to interrogation using a neutron
beam alone.

3. Apply an appropriate measure based on delayed gamma emission (Eγ = 3-6
MeV) using a plastic scintillator added to the fundamental model to validate
the general performance of a system designed to detect SNM in the presence
of background interference.
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BACKGROUND

I.

Special Nuclear Materials

A.

Definition

Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) are generally categorized in the context of
weapon applications as “direct-use” or “indirect-use.” Direct-use is clear. Indirectuse refers to the materials’ precursor potential and requires a significant amount
of enrichment or conversion effort. Direct-use nuclear materials are plutonium
(element), uranium-233 and uranium-235 of  20% enrichment. Indirect-use
nuclear materials are thorium (element) and uranium-235 of < 20% enrichment
(Cochran and Paine, 1995).

B.

Quantities of Significance

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines a “significant quantity” as
“the approximate quantity of nuclear material in respect of which, taking into
account any conversion process involved, the possibility of manufacturing a
nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded (IAEA, 1993).” With regard to illicit
movements, the IAEA specifically “…aims to have a high level of assurance that
the safeguards system would detect the diversion of a significant quantity of
nuclear material (8 kg of plutonium, 25 kg of uranium-235 in highly enriched
uranium, 75 kg of uranium-235 in natural or low enriched uranium).” The

6

remaining significant quantities are 8 kg of uranium-233 and 20,000 kg of thorium
(Cochran and Paine, 1995).

II.

Intermodal Shipping Containers

A.

History

Containerization is defined as “the utilizing, grouping or consolidating of multiple
units into a larger container for more efficient movement” and has existed for
over half a century (Rath, 1973, quoting The Containerization Institute, now “The
Containerization & Intermodal Institute“). The concept of unitized cargo conveyed
seamlessly across truck, ship and railcar as recognized today appears intuitive
on the surface. However, as with most innovations that have increased the speed
of commerce, intermodal containerization took a winding road to fruition.
Opposition from labor unions, challenges in systems engineering and the
negotiation of cost distribution throughout the transportation chain all impeded
progress. Ultimately, the economy of scale triumphed and unitized cargo,
realized as “intermodal shipping containers,” now dominate the movement of
global commerce.
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B.

Materials of Construction

Containerization implies standardization. This is only generally true for the
intermodal container. Intermodal shipping containers are rectangular in shape,
structurally robust and weather resistant (Figure 1). Materials of construction are
not as diverse as they once were as manufacture is now primarily done
overseas. Steel, with plywood flooring, is the construction material of choice due
to cost despite its poor corrosion resistance. Containers made of steel are easily
identified by their corrugated sides. Aluminum and fiberglass-reinforced plywood
(FRP) may still be found (Rath, 1973).
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Figure 1.

Intermodal shipping container, steel, 20’ (1 TEU), exterior and
interior. (www.containertech.com, http://20foothouse.com)
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C.

Dimensions

The standard unit of measure is the “20-foot equivalent unit” (TEU) and refers to
the length of a container. This measure is independent of height or width. The
term was initially introduced to describe containers with a nominal dimension of
20’ x 8’ x 8’ (L x W x H). There are now several different combinations of length
(40’, 48’ and 53’) and height (4’, 8 ½’ and 9 ½’), including an 8 ½’ width that is
primarily seen in Europe. These differing lengths are referenced in multiples and
fractions of TEUs. For example, a nominal 40-foot container (40’ x 8’ x 8’) is
equal to 2 TEU; a 48’ container is equal to 2.4 TEU.

D.

Capacities

Payload varies depending on manufacturer. Generally, a nominal 20-foot
container (1 TEU) has an internal volume on the order of 1200 ft 3 (34 m3) and a
payload capacity of 48,000 lbs. (22,000 kg). A nominal 40-foot container (2
TEU) has an internal volume on the order of 2400 ft 3 (68 m3) and a payload
capacity of 60,000 lbs. (27,000 kg). Note that doubling the volume does not
equate to a doubling in payload capacity. To provide some idea of their value,
used shipping containers in good condition are available for sale on the internet
from ~$2000 (20’) to ~$3000 (40’) (ELG, 2012).
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III.

The Inspection System

A.

Container Traffic

Container traffic is measured in TEUs. In 2010, 114.3 million loaded TEUs
worldwide were exported (WSC, 2012). Total loaded traffic including import,
export and transshipments with respect to the United States now approaches 30
million TEUs (Figure 2). This equates to approximately 20 million boxes of mixed
lengths, presenting a challenging number to inspect.
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Figure 2.

TEU traffic, ~20 million containers (from USDOT, 2009).
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B.

History

The current inspection scheme for containers entering the United States consists
of a “layered system of layers” (Kelly, 2007). It begins with the 24 Hour Advanced
Cargo Rule. An accurate cargo manifest with valid consignee addresses must be
submitted to a clearinghouse 24 hours before loading on a vessel bound for the
United States. The Automated Targeting System (ATS) uses algorithms to
analyze data from the manifests to identify containers for additional scrutiny on
arrival to a U.S. port, including physical inspections. The Container Security
Initiative (CSI) program is applied outside the United States. It employs U.S.
personnel stationed at ports around the world to identify “high risk” containers onsite, using the aforementioned 24 Hour Rule manifests, and includes limited use
of some imaging and radiation detection technologies. The emphasis is on
curbing the impact to the speed of commerce; consequently, less than one
percent of the containers are scanned in any fashion, and only a fraction of these
are actually opened. In contrast, within the United States “the selection and
physical examination of cargo amounts to 3% - 5% of all merchandise being
imported and exported” (PTG, 2010). A schema of the process is provided in
Figure 3.
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Figure 3.

The importation process (from PTG, 2010).
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The Megaports Initiative is also an overseas program, but looks specifically for
illicit nuclear materials, including SNM, with National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) radiation portal monitors (RPMs). Handheld devices are
also employed in the form of radioisotope identification devices (RIIDs), standard
survey meters and high performance germanium (HPGe) detectors. The Initiative
is active in over 27 foreign ports and scans all inbound, outbound and
transshipped cargo (Reynolds & Dusina, 2010). It is important to note that, aside
from x-ray imaging and fast neutron and gamma-ray radiography (FNGR), the
search for SNM applies passive methods (Sowerby et al., 2009, Bjorkholm,
2003).

C.

Special Nuclear Materials Detection

Passive radiation detection takes many forms and can be very sensitive. This
sensitivity can lead to false alarms from naturally occurring radioactive material
(NORM) such as potassium-40 found in bananas (Hosenball, 2008). The
additional inspection required to clear a container containing NORM or other
approved man-made source results in a delay that may be monetarily significant.
A false alarm rate of ≤ 0.5% in practice appears to be tolerable (Port of Oakland,
2005). The number of threat items that pass undetected is unknown. This lack of
information and the associated potentially catastrophic consequences has driven
research into active approaches that induce nuclear reactions, namely fission, in
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SNM and then attempt to detect the unique particle signatures produced from the
events. Initially, fast neutron beams alone were considered because of their
ability to induce fission at essentially any incident energy. However, the
combination of beam scattering by low Z hydrogenous materials and
interference(s) resulting from neutron activation of the cargo are problematic
(Slaughter et al., 2007a; Pruett et al., 2005). More recently, the notion of
increasing the energy and magnitude of existing photon imaging beam systems
to induce photofission in SNM is being seriously considered (Danagoulian et al.,
2010). Energetic photon beams can penetrate low Z elements easily. The dualbeam

active

interrogation

concept

applies

both

of

these

techniques

simultaneously to meaningfully penetrate a larger scope of cargo. Unlike the
radiation portal monitor that is deployed to passively survey nearly everything,
any active interrogation technique would apply to only a small fraction of the
container traffic currently selected for physical examination in the first place.

IV.

Active Interrogation

A.

Neutron Experiments

A substantial experimental effort was undertaken at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL) using neutron beams to interrogate surrogate cargos
and SNM targets (Hall et al., 2007; Slaughter et al., 2007b). This program
commonly referred to as the “Nuclear Car Wash” investigated particle signatures
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produced by interrogating highly enriched uranium targets buried within steel or
plywood matrices. They confirmed that neutron beams are adept at penetrating
high Z substances such as iron, but scatter considerably in the presence of
hydrogenous (low Z) material. These characteristics make it challenging to
penetrate cargo, such as coffee, to induce fission events using these neutrons. In
addition, it was found that the potential creation of noise signatures from cargo
activation dictates that neutron beam energies must be 10 MeV or less
(Slaughter et al., 2007b). A less energetic beam reduces its effective penetration,
but this trade-off is well worth the cost, particularly when the maximum
penetration distances of concern are only on the order ~48” (~122 cm) or roughly
half the height/width of a shipping container.

B.

Photon Experiments

A number of relevant photofission experiments have been conducted (Proctor et
al., 2012, Rennhofer et al., 2010, Myers et al., 2004, Jones et al., 2000, Gmar &
Capdevila, 1999, Hollas et al., 1987). Several of these experiments measured
delayed particle emissions. An excellent example of a delayed gamma spectrum
from the photofission of uranium-238 is provided in Figure 4. The shape of this
delayed spectrum is very similar to that of neutron induced fission as nearly the
same chain of decay products, and consequently β-delayed gammas, are
produced.
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Figure 4.

Experimental delayed gamma energy spectrum resulting from
photofission of uranium-238 using 15 MeV photons, top trace (from
Proctor, et al., 2012).
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C.

Simulations

Interrogation experiments such as those described in the previous sections are
time consuming and expensive to conduct and consequently have limited scope.
Unsurprisingly, there appears to be no experimental evidence available in the
public realm at this time with regard to near simultaneous neutron and photon
beam interrogation. Clearly, low cost simulations using code suites developed
with this explicit task in mind are needed to help fill the gap and smooth the way
for better informed experimental designs.

There are several neutron interrogation simulations of SNM targets in the
literature. The LLNL COG effort is the most relevant for this work (Prussin et al.,
2006, Buck et al., 2002, Buck & Hall, 1999). An interesting set of benchmarking
exercises involving delayed gamma simulation in MCNPX has also been
conducted (Durkee et al., 2009). There are no published dual-beam simulation
efforts available. This is likely due to the complexity and unrealized need to
seriously consider photofission contributions and there is limited work to mitigate
this deficiency (Verbeke et al., 2010).

D.

Work by the University of New Mexico

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) continues to fund initiatives
exploring civil and military applications for active interrogation (also referred to as
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“standoff detection systems“), beam sources and improvements to computational
transport solvers and associated nuclear data (i.e. cross section libraries).
Research was recently concluded for one of these DTRA programs under the
direction of Professor Cassiano R.E. de Oliveira at the University of New Mexico
(de Oliveira et al., 2009). The proposal called for:


Improvement and extension of particle transport methods and codes to be
used for testing and validation of proposed standoff detection systems.



Improvement of key nuclear data necessary for unambiguous detection of
concealed nuclear material and incorporation of results into simulation
tools.



Application of a suite of particle transport codes for benchmarking against
relevant experimental data and for examining and evaluating potential
DTRA-funded systems applications.

The resultant code suite developments from this endeavor were successfully
benchmarked against the aforementioned LLNL “Nuclear Car Wash” set of
experiments investigating the detection of shielded SNM inside a shipping
container surrogate using neutron beam interrogation (Martin, 2012; Hall et al.,
2007, Church et al., 2006). This enhanced code suite will be applied in part to
achieve the research aims of this dissertation, which also serves as a natural
continuation to the contracted DTRA work.
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MODELS AND METHODS

I.

Delayed Gamma Production

A.

Neutron Induced Fission

Neutron induced fission can occur when a neutron (at essentially any energy)
interacts with fissile material. For example, if a uranium-235 nucleus absorbs a
neutron, the resulting compound nucleus quickly breaks into two primary
fragments and releases ~200 MeV of energy. Most of the energy is kinetic with a
large fraction (173 MeV) retained by the unstable primary fission fragments and
resulting prompt neutrons. Prompt gamma-rays and neutinos make up another
16 MeV. The remaining 11 MeV of energy is distributed down the decay chain of
fission fragment daughters in the form of beta particles and delayed gamma-rays
produced from beta decay.

B.

Photon Induced Fission

If an incident photon is energetic enough (> 5 MeV), it may also induce fission
events in SNM through the process of photofission (Gallmeier, 2005, Haxby et
al., 1941). This photonuclear course tends to be less efficient as the excited
nucleus may undergo other de-excitation processes instead. If fission does
occur, the result produces a family of prompt and delayed decay products
considered nearly identical to that produced by neutron induced fission (Verbeke
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et al., 2010). An incident photon energy of 14 MeV appears ideal (Figure 5). As
an aside, a practical upper limit of 16 MeV may be considered due to the
photonuclear reaction O18 (γ,p) N17 that results in a neutron emission similar to
that of the delayed neutron signature from SNM (Jones et al., 2007). Although
not addressed here, it is conceivable that delayed neutron measurements will be
included in any active interrogation method deployed.
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Figure 5.

Photofission cross sections for uranium-235, uranium-238 and
thorium-232. The largest cross sections are realized with photons
at energies of ~14 MeV (from Jones et al., 2000).
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C.

Delayed Gamma Detection

The hallmarks for detection of irradiated uranium-235 and plutonium-239 are the
creation of large numbers of beta-delayed gamma-rays (Eγ ≥ 3 MeV) from fission
product decay with a short effective half-life of ~25 seconds (Norman et al.,
2004).

(from Pruet et al., 2005)

The method of detection is based on tallying the delayed gamma-ray emission
(Eγ = 3-7 MeV) from fission product decay produced from concealed SNM. The
measurements take place near the surface of the container over approximately
90 seconds post interrogation. A signal interface to indicate the SNM status of a
container is required and should follow the same simple paradigm as that used
for generic portal alarm monitors (Figure 6).
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Figure 6.

A remote alarm monitor unit used with pedestrian, vehicle and train
portal monitors. The unit provides both audible and visual
indications for gamma and neutron radiation alarms (from TSA,
2012).
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D.

Detection System Performance

Alarm threshold values may not be crisp, and would be determined partially
through modeling (as proposed here), experimental testing and lessons learned
from deployed systems. When added to the myriad of other sources of
uncertainty that may be encountered (NORM, detector performance, operator
error, etc.), the inevitable result is “false positive” and “false negative” outcomes.
A “false positive” is defined as an indication by the instrument that a radioactive
source is present when the source is not present; a “false negative” is defined as
a lack of indication by the instrument to a radioactive source that is present
(DNDO, 2011). With respect to SNM, false positives would trigger profound (and
costly) emergency responses and one false negative could have catastrophic
consequences (Aloise, 2009). Clearly, false signals should be minimized.
Because dual-beam active interrogation research is in its infancy, initial markers
for allowable false signal rates may be borrowed from an appropriate field. The
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office’s (DNDO) now-defunct Cargo Advanced
Automated Radiography System (CAARS) had an allowable false positive rate of
1 in 200 (0.5%) and an allowable false negative rate of 1 in 60 (1.67%) for
detecting shielded 100 cc cubes of high atomic number elemental materials (Z ≥
72) (Quiter et al., 2008). Since the properties and dimensions of the CAARS
objects of interest are similar to what is considered here, those rates will be
adopted for this work.
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II.

Neutral Particle Interrogation

Active interrogation systems using neutral particles are intended for identification
of concealed special nuclear material. If a neutron, or gamma-ray with a high
enough energy, interacts with SNM and produces fission events, prompt and
delayed neutrons and gamma-rays will be emitted (Figure 7). Fast neutron
beams are adept at penetrating high Z substances such as iron, but scatter
considerably in the presence of hydrogenous (low Z) material. Neutrons may also
be significantly attenuated if there is a high degree of non-uniformity, or
“clumpiness,” in the cargo regardless of the material (Pruet et al., 2005). These
characteristics make it challenging to penetrate cargo, such as wood, to induce
fission events using these neutrons. The creation of nuisance signatures dictates
that neutron beam energies must be < 10 MeV, which also limits penetration
(Slaughter et al., 2007b). On the other hand, any delayed gammas produced as
a result of fission events are poorly attenuated and therefore easier to detect.
The lack of attenuation can be exploited in reverse by generating a gamma-ray
beam and using it to penetrate the cargo.

27

Figure 7.

A neutral particle active interrogation system showing delayed
particle production resulting from fission product decay alone (from
de Oliveira et al., 2009).
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An additional benefit of using a photon beam is that it is “mostly sensitive to
average opacities” at the densities of interest, thereby providing an advantage
over neutrons in penetration when non-uniform, or “clumpy,” cargos are
encountered (Pruet et al., 2005). This technique also provides an avenue to
penetrate low-Z engineered shielding such as polyethylene and creates
essentially no interfering activation products.

III.

Simulation Outline

A template adopted from Nelson & Sokkappa, 2008, is provided in Figure 8. To
summarize, this research involves:


an operational scenario examining sections of loaded intermodal shipping
containers;



modeling threat and nuisance (or noise) sources;



addressing the ambient background range;



the computational radiation transport of neutrons and photons;



the tracking and detection of delayed gammas using a plastic scintillation
detector and/or current tallies through a surface;



the application of an alarm algorithm based on S/N ratio;



establishing performance benchmarks based on industry standards.
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Figure 8.

General components to define when simulating a detection system.
(from Nelson & Sokkappa, 2008).
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The research addresses the components in Figure 8 as follows:

A.

Operational Scenario

Surrogate models comprised of 0.4 TEU sections filled with a variety of
homogenized materials at differing densities representative of those imported
into the United States and subjected to interrogation by a neutron beam or
neutron and photon beams simultaneously.

B.

Threat Source Signature

An object requested by Rapiscan Systems of Torrance, CA to be fabricated by
the Y-12 National Security Complex and referred to as Test Object “E” in a letter
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Shahabidin, 2011). The threat source is
600g of uranium oxide (U3O8) containing 100g of uranium-235 (19.75%
enrichment). The object is in the shape of a puck that is 12.1 cm (4.75”) in
diameter and 2.54 cm (1”) thick with a density of 2.05 g/cc.

C.

Nuisance Source Population

The definition of the “nuisance source population” is better served by dividing
those signals that are produced as a by-product of scission, but not of interest, as
a “nuisance” and anything else as “noise.” Noise includes detector signals
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registered by photons or facsimiles produced by neutron activation, cosmic rays,
line voltage spikes, etc.

1.

Nuisance

Thorium is one of the most prevalent passive NORM signatures encountered and
is associated with shipments of building materials like cement, tiles and
plasterboard (Kouzes et al., 2006, Sokkappa et al., 2009). Along with fission,
photofission can also take place in thorium-232 with photon E > 6 MeV, thereby
producing its own delayed gamma signature on interrogation (Haxby et al.,
1941). A concentration of 240 Bq/kg of cargo (a mass fraction of ~0.006%)
represents a practical value for thorium-232 in these materials (Table 1). It is
noteworthy to point out that, although radium-226 and potassium-40 have
activities of the same magnitude as thorium, the physical mass of these isotopes
is miniscule in comparison. The nuisance source model used here is clay
(AlSi2O5(OH)4) doped with thorium-232 at 240 Bq/kg of cargo.

32

Table 1: Activity Concentrations of NORM in Building Materials (Bq/kg)

Source: IAEA 2003 Tech Report 419, pg. 104
Material

Ra-226

Th-232

K-40

1-250

1-190

5-1570

109818

<1-220

180-1600

Clay bricks

1-200

1-200

60-2000

Sand-lime bricks and sandstone

18415

10959

5-700

Natural building stones

1-500

1-310

767011

Natural gypsum

<1-70

<1-100

7-280

Cement

7-180

7-240

24-850

Tiles

30-200

20-200

160-1410

Phosphogypsum

4-700

19360

25-120

Blast furnace slag stone and cement

30-120

30-220

-

Concrete
Aerated concrete

Activity concentrations (Bq/kg) of naturally occurring radioactive materials
(NORM) in building materials. Reproduced from the World Nuclear Association
(NORM, 2011).
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2.

Noise

There are a host of neutron activation products to avoid. Many are eliminated by
selecting neutron interrogation energies below their respective activation energy
thresholds or by delaying the start of counting by a few seconds post
interrogation to limit or eliminate the impact of short-lived activation products
(Table 2). At a neutron interrogation En = 7 MeV, only fluorine is of real concern
as an interference source (Church et al., 2007a). A post interrogation delay of six
seconds prior to the start of signal collection is incorporated based on past
experimental work. In addition, there will be activation products created outside
the cargo container by the interrogation process such as the portal structure or
underlying pavement. These anomalous photon sources may be shielded to
some extent, for example, by wrapping the detector(s) in thin lead sheeting.
Actual values for noise would have to be measured using the deployed system
(Nelson & Sokkappa, 2008). Therefore, a range of background noise from 1010000 counts/sec in the E = 3-5 MeV range is applied during post-processing to
simulate system performance.
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Table 2: Neutron Activation Products of Concern

Activation products of concern including incident neutron activation threshold
energies (from Slaughter et al., 2007a).
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D.

Ambient Background

The maximum energy of terrestrial background radiation is 2.6 MeV (Slaughter et
al., 2007b). This is below the delayed gamma energy of interest (Eγ ≥ 3 MeV).
There is measurable cosmic ray activity. Again, all of this passive background
information would have to be empirically determined on site by counting so that it
can be compensated for prior to interrogation (Nelson & Sokkappa, 2008).

E.

Radiation Transport

Radiation transport is modeled with the solver MCNPX2.7.0 coupled to
CINDER2008g using TINDER. MCNPX is a Monte Carlo radiation transport
computer code that “transports nearly all particles at nearly all energies for nearly
all applications” (Pelowitz et al., 2011, Pelowitz, 2011). CINDER is a
transmutation code that uses Markovian chains to determine temporal densities
of nuclides in a radiation environment. The program follows “all paths of nuclide
transmutation,” defined as the conversion of a nuclide to a different nuclide by
particle absorption and/or radioactive decay (Holloway et al., 2011, Wilson et al.,
2007). CINDER2008g is a modified version (“g” for gamma) to include a
photofission capability (Martin, 2012). TINDER is a generalized code for coupling
transport solvers to CINDER with a substantial degree of automation (Id.).
MCNPX, CINDER and TINDER are all written in the Fortran90 language.
TINDER also utilizes Perl scripts as needed.
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F.

Detection System Hardware

Plastic scintillator modeled after the Eljen Technology EJ-200 as used by the
“Nuclear Car Wash” (Hall et al., 2007a). The EJ-200 specification sheet is
reproduced in Appendix F. Polyvinyltoluene (PVT) is the most common type of
plastic scintillator material used in radiation portal monitors for screening
vehicles. It is an environmentally robust and cost effective product for creating
large cross sectional detection areas (Ely et al., 2006).

G.

Alarm Algorithm

In the cases considered here, the alarm algorithm is based on some applicable
form of signal-to-noise (S/N) ratio to identify photons in the energy range of 3-6
MeV. The photons of interest are born as decay chain by-products of fission
events in SNM and constitute the “signal.” Photons or facsimiles resulting from
activation of the cargo and its surroundings, cosmic ray interactions and anything
else that would trigger a signal in the detection equipment in that energy window
are considered “noise.” Measurements taken before interrogation constitute the
passive background and may or may not contribute to the definition of noise.
More precisely, depending on the active background produced by each cargo
from neutron interrogation (empirically determined) threshold values for sensed
delayed gamma-rays would specify a response of either detected (detectable),
undetected (undetectable) or indeterminate based on the performance
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requirement(s) for the detection system. It is important to note that, unlike
passive background, active background cannot be measured and then simply
subtracted, but rather takes on a complex role in defining the noise in any signal
detection algorithm.

H.

Performance Evaluation

What is desired is a set of performance requirements that any detection system
must achieve in order to be considered successful in identifying the presence of
a minimum quantity of SNM. These performance requirements are commonly
defined using terms such as “false positive rate” and “rate of detection.” Ideally,
a detection system would successfully identify the target quantity (or more) 100%
of the time it is present, and never alarm when it is not. This is possibly
achievable in a controlled environment, but not practically achievable at a
container terminal.

This study should provide some insight for one critical question: What are the
conditions for which a neutron beam alone is sufficient for interrogation? This is
an important consideration as the ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable)
concept can be logically extended from personal exposure to the treatment of
commercial cargo.
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There will also be an attempt to incorporate DNDO-derived allowable false
positive and negative rate targets (≤ 0.5% and ≤ 1.67% respectively) for this
simulated system in a meaningful way (Bjorkholm & Boeh, 2006). A generic
figure-of-merit developed by LLNL and based on a generic receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve for the rates above will be modified to incorporate
signals produced from photofission (Slaughter et al., 2007b).

IV.

Simulation Model

A.

Basis

The fundamental design for these computational simulations is primarily based
on previous models and conclusions from Moss et al., 2006, Slaughter et al.,
2007a, and from work performed for DTRA at the University of New Mexico
under Professor de Oliveira by Rodney Keith, Billy Martin and Elliot Leonard (de
Oliveira et al., 2009).

B.

Container

The container model is an 8’ x 8’ x 8’ (244 cm x 244 cm x 244 cm) box with an
inclusive 3/16” (4.76 mm) carbon steel wall (Moss et al., 2006). This is equivalent
to 0.4 TEU and allows a full size container to be modeled in sections. This
represents an accurate reproduction of what would actually occur in an
interrogation portal as the entire container would probably not be surveyed, only
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one or two sections of interest and not all at once. When combined with the
imaging resolution now quickly and routinely obtained by current hardware, the
distribution of cargo can be easily ascertained for possible homogenization
and/or precise identification of a section or sections to interrogate. The method is
not limited to shipping containers and could be used for any cuboidal (Figures 9
and 10).

Note that the carbon steel wall in the model is unrealistically thick due of its
mass; this is to compensate for particle attenuation by insulation and/or interior
walls found in actual containers. Steel dry cargo shipping containers have outer
wall thicknesses of 1.6mm to 2 mm (1/16” - 5/64”) (Steinecker, 2010).

40

Figure 9.

Dry freight trailer loaded with tires (quasi-homogeneous). The
resolution observed here is more than adequate for the purposes of
sectioning (red area) and homogenization (from Stevenson, 2005).
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Figure 10.

Combined neutron and x-ray image of an aluminum unit load
device (ULD) used for air cargo (~ 5’ x 5’ x 5’). This ULD contains
computer monitors, a vase, bottles, and a sack of chemicals (left),
air conditioners and gas cylinders (middle), and vegetables (right)
(from Buffler & Tickner, 2010 and Cutmore et al., 2010).
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C.

Surrogate Cargo

Surrogate cargoes have been selected that initially span three classes of
average atomic numbers (Z) and densities (g/cc) associated with importations.
The surrogates are homogenized representations. These cargo classes are in
part based on the Z recommendations of Slaughter et al., 2007a, and the key
density distributions were obtained through manifests analyzed by Descalle et
al., 2006 (Figure 11).

Homogenized surrogate cargos are composed of Low, Medium or High Z
materials:


Low = Celotex® (cellulose, wood fiberboard), C6H10O5 per LANL



Medium = aluminum, Al



Medium = clay, AlSi2O5(OH)4 (also used in the NORM investigation)



High = iron, Fe



Very High = tungsten, W (current only)

The surrogates are evaluated at several densities, with the following Low,
Medium, High and Very High densities being the initial placeholders (refer to
Figure 11):


Low = 0.10 g/cc (most prevalent)



Medium = 0.30 g/cc (80% of all cargo falls below this figure)



High = 0.50 g/cc



Very High = 0.60 g/cc (“most challenging,” Slaughter, et al., 2007a)
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Figure 11.

Distribution of average cargo density collected via shipping
manifests on 14 days distributed over 12 months (from Descalle et
al., 2006).
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Three other densities of interest:


Maximum (20 ft container) = 0.65 g/cc (theoretical load maximum)



Maximum (40 ft container) = 0.40 g/cc (theoretical load maximum)



Average = 0.20 g/cc (cargo average)



Very Low = 0.05 g/cc (for consistency)

There is also an “empty container” model that is filled with air at the International
Standard Atmosphere (ISA), 0.001275 g/cc at sea level and 15°C. A series was
also done with tungsten, representing a very high Z material.

D.

Threat Target

The threat target is 600g of uranium oxide (U3O8) containing 100g of uranium235 (19.75% enrichment) and approved by the DNDO (Shahabidin, 2011). The
object is in the shape of a puck that is 12.1 cm (4.75”) in diameter and 2.54 cm
(1”) thick with a density of 2.05 g/cc.

E.

Nuisance Signal

The nuisance signal is produced by the fission of thorium-232 at a concentration
of 240 Bq/kg in the homogenized clay matrix. This was achieved in the model by
replacing an equivalent mass of oxygen (~0.01%) with thorium in the clay matrix
for each homogenized density.
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F.

Noise Target

The noise target is 600g of polytetrafluoroethylene (Teflon® PTFE). The object is
in the shape of a puck that is 12.1 cm (4.75”) in diameter and 2.54 cm (1”) thick
with a density of 2.05 g/cc. The dimensions are identical to the threat target. The
nominal density of PTFE is 2.15 g/cc (DuPont, 2012).

G.

Fundamental Model

A visualization of the fundamental model with a detector (described below) is
provided in Figure 12. A deployed system would place detectors on more than
one face with a stand-off of a few centimeters and neutral particle beams
(described below) may not enter from the same face.
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Figure 12.

The fundamental model with PVT detector (not to scale).
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H.

Neutral Particle Beams

A neutron and a photon beam are employed for this study. The beams are
modeled as monodirectional disk sources on the surface of the container,
radiating inward, with a diameter equal to the targets (12.1 cm). The 7 MeV
neutron beam energy is based on findings from the “Nuclear Car Wash”
experiments (Slaughter et al., 2007b, Hall et al., 2007). This neutron beam was
selected because it is attainable and at a low enough energy (< 10 MeV) to avoid
creating strong activation backgrounds from common low-Z materials, particularly
the

16

O (n,p)

16

N reaction, but still energetic enough to adequately penetrate

cargo (Gozani, 2009). A visual representation of neutron beam interaction in the
challenging Celotex matrix is provided in Figure 13. The uranium oxide target can
be seen clearly in the center of each image.
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Figure 13.

A 7 MeV penetrating neutron beam interacting in the Celotex cargo
surrogate model (ρ = 0.1 g/cc). The image on the left shows the
beam entering from the bottom; the viewpoint on the right is from
above looking down. The U3O8 target can be seen clearly in the
center of each image. A total of 1000 neutrons were injected. The
colors reflect subjective collision event energies with red being
“high” and blue being “low.”
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The gamma-ray beam energy of 12.2 MeV was selected from a scoping study
because it was attainable and well within the energy range to induce photofission
in SNM (Moss et al., 2006). A visual representation of photon beam penetration
is provided in Figure 14. The images in Figures 13 and 14 were produced using
the MCNPX visual editor program Vised24E (Schwarz et al., 2011).

The efficacies of both neutral particle beams in a simulation environment were
confirmed using strengths of 2 x 108 particles/sec each (Martin, 2012). The beam
strengths used for these simulations are 5 x 108 particles/sec each on the model
surface (115 cm2 spot = 4.35 x 106 particles/cm2/sec) and reflect the lower bound
of what would be expected for a working interrogation portal.
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Figure 14.

A 12.2 MeV penetrating gamma-ray beam interacting in the celotex
cargo surrogate model (0.1 g/cc). The shot on the left shows the
beam entering from the bottom; the viewpoint on the right is from
above looking down. The U3O8 target can be seen clearly in the
center of each image. A total of 1000 photons were injected. The
colors reflect subjective collision event energies with red being
“high” and blue being “low.”

51

I.

Detector

The detector is modeled after the EJ-200 Plastic Scintillator and is composed of
polyvinyltoluene (PVT) with physical dimensions (L x W x H) of 96” x 10” x 96”
(244 cm x 25.4 cm x 244 cm) and a density of 1.023 g/cc. Details from the
manufacturer, Eljen Technology, can be found in Appendix F. Gaussian energy
broadening was applied in the detector model using FWHM = 0.35 MeV (see
Results chapter). The detection response was examined using monoenergetic
photons in the delayed gamma range energy of interest (Eγ = 3-6 MeV)
independently by isotropic broadcast from the center of the fundamental model in
the presence of air at ISA. Simulated detector response to monoenergetic photon
sources of E = 3, 4, 5 and 6 MeV are plotted together in Figure 15.
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Figure 15.

Response to independent monoenergetic photons of 3, 4, 5 and 6
MeV isotropically broadcast from the center of the surrogate model
filled with air at ISA.
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J.

Detection Figure-of-Merit

1.

Definition

A figure-of-merit was appropriated from the “Nuclear Car Wash” to judge the
performance of a detection system utilizing dual-beam interrogation and delayed
gamma-ray measurement (Slaughter et al., 2007a; 2007b). The figure-of-merit
(Fs) statistic is rephrased here to indicate delayed gamma signals as a result of
neutron-induced fission and photofission separately as well:

with,
√

√

where,
S = delayed gamma signal (3-6 MeV) from interrogation
Sn = delayed gamma signal (3-6 MeV) from neutron interrogation
Sp = delayed gamma signal (3-6 MeV) from photon interrogation
B = mean background (3-5 MeV) captured by late counting (> 85 sec)
σ = expression for standard deviation term

This approximate value of σ was proposed by Slaughter as a “rule-of-thumb” to
reasonably bound variations in the background count from a plethora of sources
including detection system drift, repeated activation of the environment and
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diurnal changes in the cosmic ray flux. This makes the figure-of-merit calculation
considerably more conservative and unavoidable with regard to computational
modeling due to the inability to make the empirical measurements necessary to
determine σ directly. Therefore this “rule-of-thumb” is applied here for estimating
Fs. If systematic variations are found to be small through experiment, improved
nuclear data, or uncertainty analyses then the factor of two can be reduced (or
ideally eliminated) and the standard deviation term would approach that for a
Poisson distribution:
√

Note that the measurement of B is over a narrower energy range, E = 3-5 MeV,
rather than the signal range Eγ = 3-6 MeV. The general background contribution
at E > 5 MeV is insignificant (Luu et al., 2007). Truncating the energy range also
eliminates the possibly large B-skewing spike in ~6 MeV photons resulting from
fluorine activation. Lastly, if the signals are considered separately (i.e. S = Sn +
Sp) the additional signal produced by the photon beam (Sp) should have a
disproportionate impact on Fs as there would be little, if any, contribution to B for
a deployed system.

The primary time integrated signal(s) and active background (essentially zero for
the homogenized materials used here) for the calculation of Fs are determined
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over the period of 7-40 seconds post-irradiation (34 seconds total). The Fs
threshold value for reliable system operation is based on DNDO performance
requirements of a maximum false negative rate of 1.67% and 0.5% maximum
false positive rate and determined by examining a set of relevant receiver
operating characteristic curves.

2.

Application

Slaughter constructed generic receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves
using Gaussian assumptions for signal and noise shapes with the probability of
detection (Pd) and probability of false positive (Pfp) defined as:

Alarm

[

(

[

√

(

√

)]

)]
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with,

and,
√
where,
Fs = figure-of-merit
Fb = background factor
S = delayed gamma signal from interrogation
B = mean background (noise)
L = alarm threshold
σ = standard deviation

The ROC curves (Fs) represent these probabilities as a function of L as shown in
Figures 16 and 17. Examination of these plots together reveal a broad range in
error rates for Fs = 1 to Fs = 7. As an aside, it was found that “large variations in
Fb have no observable effect on error rates;” in other words, the ROC curves
look essentially the same regardless of the background factor (Slaughter et al.,
2007b). Tracing the curve for Fs = 5 to the minimum detection probability (Pd) of
98.33%, the corresponding false positive rate (Pfp) is < 0.5% and the DNDO
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performance requirements are met. In other words, the system is predicted to
perform as designed against any cargo threats where the detected delayed
gamma-ray signal exceeds the mean background rate by five standard
deviations as defined. An example of declining, but possibly acceptable, system
performance can be illustrated by tracing Fs = 3, where Pd = 95% yields a false
positive rate of nearly 10%. If examination frequency is suitably low, the high
number of false alarms may be tolerable. To summarize:


Fs ≥ 5, good system performance (meets DNDO goals)



5 > Fs > 2, declining system performance (increasing false alarm rates)



Fs ≤ 2, poor system performance (unreliable)
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Figure 16.

Generic ROC curves for Fs = 3 (pink), Fs = 5 (green) an Fs = 7
(blue). With Fs = 5 at the minimum detection probability (Pd) of
0.9833, the false positive rate (Pfp) is < 0.005 and the DNDO
performance requirements are met (adapted from Prussin et al.,
2005).
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Figure 17.

Generic ROC curves for Fs = 1 to 6. The goal set for the “Nuclear
Car Wash” was a minimum detection probability (Pd) of 0.95 and a
false alarm rate (PfA) of 0.001. This performance is achieved with
Fs = 5 as well (“ROC curve for Fb = 10” from Slaughter et al.,
2007b).
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V.

Simulation Flow

Experimental sampling is performed on surrogate models with the radiation
transport code MCNPX2.7.0 coupled to the transmutation code CINDER2008g
using the generalized wrapper TINDER. The TINDER wrapper controls the
process by initially calling MCNPX twice to transport interrogating beams of
neutrons or photons to the target. The resulting neutron and photon fluxes
created in the target cell from neutron and photon induced fission events are
added and supplied to CINDER for the first transmutation time step. The delayed
gammas produced in the target are then transported out using MCNPX again.
The CINDER-MCNPX process is repeated for as many time steps as specified.
Two text files are created and continuously updated from the standard
voluminous output produced with every user-defined time step calculation. One
file contains the energy binned instantaneous delayed gamma tally crossing one
surface of the surrogate container cube (MCNPX “F1” tally). The other file
contains the energy binned instantaneous pulse height tally created from delayed
gamma-ray interaction within the PVT detector (MCNPX “F8” pulse height tally).
The detector is adjacent to the F1-tallied surface to provide a coarse estimate of
its efficiency. Both tallies are multiplied by the CINDER-derived total number of
gamma-rays created, based on the original particle flux at the target, to produce
a notional count. The flow of the simulation is presented in Figure 18.
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Figure 18.

The flow of the simulation. The TINDER wrapper controls the entire
process by initially calling MCNPX twice to transport each
interrogating beam to the target. The resulting target cell fluxes are
added and CINDER is called for the first time step. The delayed
gammas produced in the target are then transported out using
MCNPX. The CINDER-MCNPX process is repeated for as many
time steps as specified by the user.
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A.

Time Scales

In the fundamental model, particle beam(s) are switched on for 30 seconds
(“interrogating”). The beam(s) are switched off, and tallying for effect begins six
seconds later; this would allow a large quantity of low energy photons (< 3 MeV)
from short-lived activation products to die away in a deployed system. Fission
products have decay times ranging from 5–150 seconds (Slaughter et al., 2004).
Instantaneous tallies are recorded immediately after irradiation (time zero) and at
one-second intervals starting with six and ending with ten seconds postirradiation. Subsequent steps are taken in five second intervals out to 100
seconds post-irradiation (only 40 seconds post-irradiation with the detector
present). Time steps are user-defined; the schedule here is based on the
“Nuclear Car Wash” experiments and is sufficient for this work. Time-integration
of the delayed gammas is easily accomplished using Microsoft Works 9.0
Spreadsheet to achieve the final energy binned result.

B.

Delayed Gamma Current Tally

All delayed gamma-rays created up to Eγ = 30 MeV are tracked and transported
through the back end (CINDER-MCNPX) of the code suite. The instantaneous
delayed gamma current tally produced in the final output of the simulation is
expressed in five bins: < 2.6 MeV, 2.6-3 MeV, 3-4 MeV, 4-5 MeV, 5-6 MeV, 6-7
MeV and > 7 MeV. The energy bins are defined by the user; this level of fidelity is
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more than sufficient. The delayed gammas of interest for detecting SNM are
captured in the three bins that define a 3-6 MeV window. The narrow window
extends a reasonable degree of conservatism to any ultimate finding.

C.

Delayed Gamma Pulse Height Tally

All delayed gammas created up to Eγ = 30 MeV are tracked and transported
through the back end (CINDER-MCNPX) of the code suite. The instantaneous
delayed gamma pulse height tally produced in the final output of the simulation is
expressed in 99 uniform energy bins (50 KeV width) from 2-7 MeV. The energy
bins are defined by the user; this level of fidelity is more than sufficient. The
delayed gammas of interest for detecting SNM are captured in the bins that
define a 3-6 MeV window. There are comparatively few events above Eγ = 6 MeV
and narrowing the window at a deployed interrogation portal would help eliminate
spurious signals, for example, from cosmic rays. Note that the binning reported
extends down to Eγ = 2.6 MeV for contemplation and it may prove useful in the
future for looking only at photon beam interrogation results.

D.

Computing Systems

Code suite simulations related to delayed gamma current determinations alone
(the fundamental model without the PVT detector) were performed on a Toshiba
Satellite A505 laptop computer with 4 GB of RAM and an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU
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(2 x 2.20 GHz) running the Windows 7 (64-bit) operating system. A PNY SDHC
flash card (16 GB, Class 10) was employed to host the primary working directory
for each sampling experiment as the ultimate file size was ~1 GB.

Simulations including the PVT detector are computationally more expensive and
were performed on a Dell Precision T5500 desktop computer with 24 GB of RAM
and an Intel Xeon X5550 CPU (8 x 2.66 GHz) running the Red Hat Enterprise
Linux Version 6.3 (64-bit) operating system. This allowed MCNPX to be executed
in parallel (MPI) and reduced the wall clock time required to produce statistically
significant pulse height tallies. The CINDER code has not been parallelized as
yet, but consumes an insignificant amount of CPU time during its execution (on
the order of seconds) for the type of problems considered here.
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RESULTS

I.

Anticipated Outcomes

Interrogating a homogenized section of a suspect shipping container with both
neutron and photon beams at the appropriate energies should:


Yield an increased delayed gamma signal, if SNM is encountered, over a
neutron beam alone.



Extend the system performance envelope in the presence of background
noise for any given cargo by increasing the delayed gamma signal from
SNM.



Further reduce the amount of prior information needed about the makeup
of the cargo without compromising the interrogation result.

II.

Trial Simulations

Several trial simulations of the fundamental model using plutonium or 95%
enriched uranium spheres in Celotex were run to get an idea of the delayed
gamma production in significant quantities of ideal threat materials. These
studies did not include a detector. Neutron transport was initially accomplished
using 2 x 106 histories for neutron transport and all photon transport
(interrogating beam and subsequent delayed gamma-rays) set at 1 x 107
histories. No variance reduction techniques were applied.
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Figures 19 and 20 demonstrate simulations of instantaneous delayed gamma
emission over 100 seconds (1.67 minutes) induced by dual-beam interrogation
of a large spheres of uranium (8 cm) or plutonium (10 cm) in Celotex (ρ = 0.4
g/cc, maximum for a 40’ container). The top two time points in the chart legends,
0.000 seconds (blue) and 30.000 seconds (red), denote the gamma-ray emission
due to natural decay and immediately following interrogation respectively. Figure
19 shows the instantaneous delayed gamma (Eγ = 3-6 MeV) emission rate 6-100
seconds post-irradiation from the uranium sphere alone after a 30 second
interrogation with 7 MeV neutron and 12.2 MeV photon beams. The emission
rate (Eγ = 3-7 MeV) for the plutonium sphere is provided in Figure 20 under
identical circumstances. Beam strengths for both cases remained the same (5 x
108 particles/sec) with the spot sizes on the surrogate surface equaling the
diameter of the spheres. The magnitudes of the delayed gamma rates from each
target alone strongly imply that 1) neither target would represent much of an
identification challenge, and 2) plutonium is less challenging to detect than
uranium. Both of these observations tend to support the general industry
consensus, particularly with regard to plutonium.
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Figure 19.

Instantaneous delayed gamma emission (Eγ = 3-6 MeV) rate 6-100
seconds post-irradiation from target alone after 30 second
interrogation with 7 MeV neutron and 12.2 MeV photon beams.
95% enriched uranium sphere (d=8 cm, 5 kg) in a cube of
homogenized Celotex at a density of 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 20.

Instantaneous delayed gamma emission (Eγ = 3-7 MeV) rate 6-100
seconds post-irradiation from target alone after 30 second
interrogation with 7 MeV neutron and 12.2 MeV photon beams.
Plutonium-239 sphere (d=10 cm, 8.27 kg) in a cube of
homogenized Celotex at a density of 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 21 describes the binned cumulative delayed gamma emission current (Eγ
= 3-6 MeV) from the same plutonium sphere exiting one side of the cube over 94
seconds of counting (T + 7 to 100 seconds post-interrogation). This indicates that
nearly one million delayed gamma-rays would be available for detection after
passing through a comparatively dense matrix.

These simulations were the only experiments conducted using plutonium.
Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) are difficult to acquire legally,
much less illegally. One of the key reasons why only a uranium target of low
enrichment was considered for this research is because kilogram quantities of
oxides are obtainable for physical testing (Shahabidin, 2011). Enrichment is also
largely unimportant from the standpoint of active interrogation because only the
mass of fissionable material illuminated by the beam matters (Slaughter et al.,
2007a). Finally, unescorted smuggling of plutonium or HEU through avenues of
transport subject to routine inspection (ship, train, plane or truck) is highly
unlikely because of the value of the material. Instead, meaningful quantities can
and have been transported in person (Smalling, 2004).
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Figure 21.

Cumulative (7-100 seconds post-irradiation) delayed gamma
emission (Eγ = 3-6 MeV) through one vertical side of surrogate
container cube after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. Plutonium-239 sphere (d=10 cm,
8.27 kg) in homogenized Celotex at a density of 0.4 g/cc.
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III.

Delayed Gamma Current Results

Cubes of homogeneous materials with the Rapiscan-derived target embedded at
the center were interrogated with a single neutron beam, or a neutron and photon
beam simultaneously. The resulting cumulative delayed gamma emissions (Eγ =
3-6 MeV) exiting one vertical side of the cube were plotted against increasing
density from 48 sampling experiments (16 per material). The results are
presented in Figures 22-24 for Celotex, aluminum, and iron, respectively. These
three materials represent a foundation for studies in active interrogation as they
reflect the key Z values (atomic number) for typical cargos, with Celotex
considered a low Z material (Zavg ≈ 4), aluminum an intermediate (Z = 13), and
iron a high Z material (Z = 26).

These investigations were carried out with Monte Carlo neutron transport set at
256 x 103 histories and all photon transport (interrogating beam and subsequent
delayed gamma-ray re-transport) set at 640 x 103 histories. These parameters
produced statistically germane flux and current tallies in a timely manner.

Two more interrogation experiments were conducted on a model of an empty box
containing only air (density = 0.001275 g/cc) and the threat target to provide a
maximum gamma-ray current value. The resulting yields of 527 x 103 delayed
gammas for the neutron beam alone and 618 x 103 delayed gammas using both
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beams are plotted on each figure as a purple triangle and a green square,
respectively, straddling the y-axis.

Finally, a series of simulations were done using tungsten and clay. Tungsten
represents a very high Z material (Z = 74) that may be encountered infrequently.
Tungsten is employed as radiation shielding in both commercial and naval
nuclear

power,

for

example,

as

blankets

and

vests

composed

of

tungsten/polymer blends like those sent to Fukushima Daiichi following the Great
East Japan Earthquake (Entergy, 2011; Navy, 2009). Clay (Zavg ≈ 7) was added
because it contains silicon (Z = 14) along with aluminum. Glass (SiO2) is also
considered an intermediate Z material (Zavg = 10) for modeling purposes
(Slaughter et al., 2007a). Clay is a suitable representative for ceramics. As
thorium-232 is a nuisance source commonly associated with ceramics, a NORM
model was designed using thorium-doped clay.

Visual interpretation of the plotted points suggested that the collective result of
each simulation series was amenable to regression analysis. A linear fit (semilog) and accompanying R2 value are co-located with each series in Figures 2226.
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A.

Celotex, Aluminum and Iron

Celotex, being a hydrogenous material, represents the most challenging cargo
for a neutron beam to effectively penetrate (Figure 22). Beam scatter is
substantial, and the corresponding reduction in the neutron flux on the threat
target negatively impacts the number of fission events created. At the highest
cargo densities (ρ > 0.6 g/cc), only a few hundred delayed gamma-rays over the
cumulative 94 second counting period exit the single cube surface. The addition
of the photon beam nearly doubles the output at these densities when compared
to the neutron beam alone. The slope of the fit is visibly flattened using dualbeam interrogation with the net effect that the importance of the homogenized
cargo density is reduced.

The results for aluminum are to some extent similar to that of Celotex (Figure
23). The slope of the fit is flatter using dual-beam interrogation and the
cumulative signal at all points for both series are improved. The photon beam
delivers a noticeably enhanced signal at high densities. The R2 value is nearly
unity over the density range for both series, implying accurate interpolation.
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Figure 22.

Cumulative (7-100 seconds post-irradiation) delayed gamma
emission (3-6 MeV window) through one vertical side of surrogate
container cube after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
(N) or 7 MeV neutron and 12.2 MeV photon (N & P) beams.
Rapiscan Test Object “E” in homogenized Celotex at densities of
0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 23.

Cumulative (7-100 seconds post-irradiation) delayed gamma
emission (3-6 MeV window) through one vertical side of surrogate
container cube after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
(N) or 7 MeV neutron and 12.2 MeV photon (N & P) beams.
Rapiscan Test Object “E” in homogenized aluminum at densities of
0.05-0.65 g/cc.

76

As expected, photon beam attenuation becomes more pronounced in the iron
cargo (Figure 24). The photon beam continues to make a contribution, but the
slopes of the fits are nearly the same. It is noteworthy that both y-intercept values
coincide well with those of the target in air. The R2 values are again nearly unity
over the density range.

B.

Tungsten

Tungsten was the highest Z material examined and provides a reasonable upper
bound with regard to SNM smuggling. Tungsten may be employed as radiation
shielding to thwart primary passive radiation portal monitor (RPM) screening.
Dual-beam interrogation produces very little additional delayed gamma current
when compared to the neutron beam alone for ρ > 0.3 g/cc. As expected,
tungsten effectively shields the photon beam from the target at these densities
(Figure 25).
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Figure 24.

Cumulative (7-100 seconds post-irradiation) delayed gamma
emission (3-6 MeV window) through one vertical side of surrogate
container cube after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
(N) or 7 MeV neutron and 12.2 MeV photon (N & P) beams.
Rapiscan Test Object “E” in homogenized iron at densities of 0.050.65 g/cc.
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Figure 25.

Cumulative (7-100 seconds post-irradiation) delayed gamma
emission (3-6 MeV window) through one vertical side of surrogate
container cube after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
(N) or 7 MeV neutron and 12.2 MeV photon (N & P) beams.
Rapiscan Test Object “E” in homogenized tungsten at densities of
0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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C.

Clay and Thorium-232

Clay, like Celotex, is a mixture and is closer in natural composition to a real
cargo. Clay was initially introduced as a NORM vehicle for estimating delayed
gamma emissions from the fission of thorium-232, and only dual-beam
simulations were performed. Figure 26 actually plots two separate studies.

One study compares dual-beam interrogation results for the uranium oxide target
in clay alone or clay doped with thorium at 240 Bq/kg. The nuisance signal from
the fission of thorium-232 at a typical concentration found in earthenware did not
alter the results significantly as shown. This is an important finding that indicates
that commercial concentrations of thorium will probably not mask the presence of
SNM. However, this may not be true in the case of phosphogypsum (Table 1).
Phophogypsum (ρ = 0.9-1.7 g/cc) is a by-product of phosphoric acid production
and is increasingly regarded as a resource rather than a waste stream (Hilton,
2010). Sacks of this intermediate Z material (for agricultural use, for example), if
encountered, could pose a challenge when used to mask/shield SNM from active
interrogation. No further simulations involving thorium-232 were deemed
necessary at 240 Bq/kg because delayed gammas from thorium fission using
dual-beam interrogation did not add appreciably to the active background.
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The second study compares dual-beam interrogation results for the threat target
in clay alone using ten times the number of Monte Carlo histories (2.56 x 106 for
neutron transport, 6.40 x 106 for photon transport) to determine if there were any
notable differences between the set numbers in the delayed gamma totals. The
additional histories had little impact (“Histories x10”), and not enough to force a
change to the set number of histories used for the current tally work described in
this section (Figure 26). This bodes well for the possibility of near real-time
modeling of suspected threat objects captured from high resolution x-ray images
and opens up the possibility of limited modeling on site to estimate detector
response prior to interrogation. An outline of this idea will be described in the
Discussion.
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Figure 26.

Cumulative (7-100 seconds post-irradiation) delayed gamma
emission (3-6 MeV window) through one vertical side of surrogate
container cube after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon (N & P) beams. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
homogenized clay, with and without thorium, at densities of 0.050.65 g/cc.
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D.

Five Material Summary

Dual-beam interrogation results for all five materials previously described, plus
air, is summarized in Figure 27. The delayed gamma tally is strongly influenced
by density, as predicted, and markedly independent of homogeneous cargo
composition up to significant densities (Pruett et al., 2005). Keeping in mind that
these plots are semi-logarithmic, all five materials demonstrate essentially the
same behavior for ρ < 0.3 g/cc. In other words, given noise and assuming a
detector efficiency of 30%, the cumulative number of delayed gammas exiting
one side of the cube is so large that this unique signature for SNM would be
clearly exposed. Referring back to the distribution of average cargo density
(Figure 11), one sees that 80% of all cargo falls below 0.3 g/cc. This appears to
be a critical threshold density for the fundamental model employed here. Material
composition is largely irrelevant until this point. The neutron beam does most of
the work, but the first indication of the potential efficacy of adding the photon
beam in conjunction with high average density (above 0.3 g/cc) cargo - the most
challenging - is revealed.
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Figure 27.

Cumulative (7-100 seconds post-irradiation) delayed gamma
emission (3-6 MeV window) through one vertical side of surrogate
container cube after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon (N & P) beams. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
five materials at densities of 0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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IV.

Plastic Detector Implementation

A plastic detector (polyvinyltoluene, PVT) was added to the fundamental model
after review of the insightful delayed gamma current evaluations. The addition of
the detector transitions the model from a crude counting device to a notional
detection system. This in turn allows the application of a number of conservative
statistical methods, adding relatable human factors aspects and bridging esoteric
calculations to application (Kraemer et al., 2009).

A.

Detector Efficiency

The PVT detector was ideally located directly adjacent to the carbon steel wall
used for current measurements (Figure 12). An efficiency determination can be
made by taking the ratio of the pulse height tally produced in the detector to the
current tally through the carbon steel wall. This could also be considered a
reasonable estimate of the PVT detector’s intrinsic efficiency, ϵ, where:

for Eγ = 3-6 MeV (Knoll, 1989). A typical result is shown in Figure 28, using the
dual-beam example of the uranium oxide target in Celotex (0.05 g/cc) at seven
seconds post-irradiation, yielding ϵ ≈ 1/3. This estimate matches well with
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observations from previous experiments and simulations of ~30% for Eγ = 2.5-6
MeV (Hall et al. 2007, Slaughter et al., 2007b).

Because the current is being measured, it is important to note that there are low
energy photons bouncing back into the container from the detector. The energy
of these photons is below 2.6 MeV and has no effect on the estimate of
efficiency. The contribution from delayed gammas Eγ > 6 MeV is comparatively
small and their exclusion from the calculation has little impact (see Figure 20).
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Figure 28.

Delayed gamma emission (3-6 MeV window) at seven seconds
post-irradiation through one vertical side of surrogate container
cube and adjacent PVT detector after 30 second interrogation with
7 MeV neutron and 12.2 MeV photon beams. Rapiscan Test Object
“E” in homogenized Celotex at a density of 0.05 g/cc.
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B.

Gaussian Energy Broadening

MCNPX has a “Special Treatment for Tallies Card” that can apply Gaussian
energy broadening (GEB) to the pulse height tally to help mimic the resolution of
a physical detector. This is accomplished by defining the full width at half
maximum (FWHM in MeV) using the expression:
√
where E is the energy of the particle in MeV and the parameters a (in MeV), b (in
MeV1/2) and c (in 1/MeV) are supplied by the user. Detailed information on
observed energy resolution was limited for the EJ-200 detector and consequently
only a, and therefore a fixed FWHM, was applied. With interest focused on Eγ =
3-7 MeV, a conservative (likely over-resolved) FWHM = 0.35 MeV was chosen.
This spans the energy resolution (FWHM ÷ Eγ) range of 5-10% normally
associated with scintillation detectors used in gamma-ray spectroscopy (Knoll,
1989).

The bin structure for the delayed gamma-rays supplied by CINDER to MCNPX is
very coarse for Eγ > 2 MeV (see Appendix G). This is reflected in the unmodified
detector response using the uranium oxide target in air (Figure 29). The identical
simulation, with GEB applied, is shown in Figure 30. The broadened plot appears
smoother and is a better imitation of a physical detector. GEB was employed for
all detector work.
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Figure 29.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector is adjacent to one
vertical side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E”
in air at ISA. No Gaussian energy broadening (GEB) is used.
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Figure 30.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector is adjacent to one
vertical side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E”
in air at ISA. Gaussian energy broadening is applied.
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V.

Delayed Gamma Detection Results

After modifying the fundamental model and ancillary post-processing methods,
the findings from the delayed gamma current results were comprehensively
extended to exercise the detector. Clay was included with the three benchmark
surrogate cargos of Celotex, aluminum and iron. Clay was added to the list
because it is worth modeling; $1.21 billion of ceramic tile alone were exported to
the United States in 2010 (CTaSC, 2012).

To summarize, delayed gamma results were collected at one second intervals
from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from 10-40 seconds after 30 second
interrogation with 7 MeV neutron and/or 12.2 MeV photon beams. The PVT
detector is adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate container cube. A signal
collection time on the order of 30 seconds is adequate from experiment (Church
et al., 2007a). There are a set of three figures for each material at each average
density consisting of dual-beam, neutron beam only and photon beam only
results. They cover the density range of 0.05-0.65 g/cc at all the points detailed in
Models and Methods.
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There are a total of 24 figures for each surrogate cargo. The delayed gamma
detection results are presented in their entirety in the appendices:


Appendix A: Air



Appendix B: Celotex



Appendix C: Aluminum



Appendix D: Clay



Appendix E: Iron

The figures as a whole provide a comprehensive look at simulated detector
responses to delayed gamma emission (Eγ = 2.6-6 MeV) produced by
interrogation of the Rapiscan test object in these representative materials at
densities important to the shipping container industry.

The figures of Appendix B8, “Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in
0.65 g/cc Celotex,” are reproduced here to highlight some general features
(Figures 31-33). This simulation series represents the most challenging surrogate
cargo and reinforced by the anemic pulse tallies (less than three for Eγ ≥ 3 MeV)
in each 50 KeV bin. The “default” plot is produced from dual-beam simulations
(Figure 31). The individual beam results are noted in the chart title (Figures 32
and 33).
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Figure 31.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
Celotex at 0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 32.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 33.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.65 g/cc.
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Plotting the detector response by delayed gamma energy allows for detailed
visualization of the signal below 3 MeV. Projected detection system performance
is based on the cumulative signal for Eγ = 3-6 MeV captured over a short period
of time (< 2 minutes) as isotopic identification is impossible (Ely et al., 2006).
Extending the pulse height tally down to 2.6 MeV, the upper limit for naturally
occurring radioactivity, provides additional data in the Compton continuum that
could be incorporated to extend the performance envelope. All beam
configurations reveal there may be good signals available if background noise
can be effectively subtracted.

The five appendices serve as a library. The delayed gamma current data implies
that a neutron beam may be sufficient for low average density cargos. The library
reveals that there may be some circumstances when a photon beam alone may
be appropriate. One clear prospect is when fluorine is encountered.
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VI.

Fluorine Interference

A.

Nitrogen-16

Neutron (En > 1.6 MeV) activation of fluorine-19 (naturally occurring, 100%
isotopic concentration) results in the reaction

19

F (n,α)

16

N with subsequent β-

decay to oxygen-16 and emission of a 6.128 MeV gamma-ray (t1/2 = 7.13
seconds) (Church et al., 2007a). This is a critical, but easily identifiable,
interference source as it produces a large masking signal in a plastic detector
with a clear peak at Eγ ≈ 6 MeV even when comparatively small quantities are
present. Unfortunately, useful neutron interrogation energies are ideal for this
reaction to occur (Figure 34).
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Figure 34.

Neutron activation cross section for the

19

F (n,α) 16N reaction. The 7

MeV neutron interrogation energy used for this work is nearly ideal
(from NNDC, 2012).
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An example of this unique signal is provided in Figure 35 from the fundamental
model filled with low density Teflon (400 kg of fluorine-19 total) and interrogated
with 7 MeV neutrons using the default beam diameter of 12.1 cm. If one imagines
that the beam passes all the way through the surrogate, then ~1 kg of Teflon is
illuminated in this column. The noise produced from this small quantity of Teflon
is substantial when compared against the signals from the uranium oxide target
described in the previous section. The noise signal shape formed by the model
matches well with that demonstrated by experiment (Figure 36). Note that the
peak produced in the simulation is to the right of 6.1 MeV as compared to the
experiment which, as expected, would be shifted to the left. This is a
repercussion of the coarse binning structure used by CINDER for Eγ > 2 MeV.
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Figure 35.

Simulated detector response to gamma emission at one second
intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from 10-40
seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron beam.
PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate container
cube. Teflon at 0.03624 g/cc.
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Figure 36.

Smoothed experimental energy-counts profile of a nitrogen-16
source (irradiated Teflon, mass unknown) at 2, 7, and 12 seconds
(from Luu et al., 2007).
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B.

Teflon Target

A series of simulations were run substituting the uranium oxide target with a
Teflon target of the same dimensions and mass (600 grams). Figure 37 shows
the resulting detector response for air, and Figures 38 through 41 show
responses for Celotex, aluminum, clay and iron respectively at ρ = 0.4 g/cc. This
is the maximum average density for a 40’ container. As will be outlined below, it
is also the critical density at which the neutron beam alone is sufficient to meet
detection system performance requirements. However, as these five responses
reveal, this may not be possible if even a small amount of Teflon or other
fluorinated compounds are present during neutron interrogation. Any real signal
from concealed SNM could be effectively masked throughout Eγ = 2.6-7 MeV
when counting for effect. There appears to be no reliable field method for
subtracting this active noise even when 1) the source is obviously nitrogen-16,
and 2) the half-life is ~1/3 shorter than the observed average for the fission
products (T1/2 of 7.13 seconds versus ~20 seconds).
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Figure 37.

Simulated detector response to gamma emission at one second
intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from 10-40
seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron beam.
PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate container
cube. Teflon target (600 g puck) in air at 0.001275 g/cc (ISA).
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Figure 38.

Simulated detector response to gamma emission at one second
intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from 10-40
seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron beam.
PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate container
cube. Teflon target (600 g puck) in Celotex at 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 39.

Simulated detector response to gamma emission at one second
intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from 10-40
seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron beam.
PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate container
cube. Teflon target (600 g puck) in aluminum at 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 40.

Simulated detector response to gamma emission at one second
intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from 10-40
seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron beam.
PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate container
cube. Teflon target (600 g puck) in clay at 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 41.

Simulated detector response to gamma emission at one second
intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from 10-40
seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron beam.
PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate container
cube. Teflon target (600 g puck) in iron at 0.4 g/cc.
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Fluorine activation of this nature can be avoided by using photon interrogation
alone. Delayed gamma signals resulting from photofission could be substantially
less but this may present a partial solution when fluorinated compounds are
encountered. Figure 42 highlights the challenge in SNM identification when a
fluorinated compound is present. The threat target is virtually indistinguishable
from the Teflon cargo signal alone under neutron interrogation, boosting the
cumulative pulse count less than 4% and only at low gamma-ray energies. The
photon beam produces a clean delayed gamma signal (secondary axis), but only
about 1/4 of that produced by neutron beam interaction with the target.
Considering the lack of active background produced by the photon beam in
general, it may be possible to reliably detect SNM with these weaker signals if
system performance requirements are relaxed to allow for a higher rate of false
alarms.
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Figure 42.

Simulated detector response to gamma-ray emission 7-40 seconds
(cumulative) after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and/or 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one
vertical side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E”
in Teflon at 0.2 g/cc.
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VII.

Detection System Performance

For a given set of system performance requirements, based on neutron beam
interrogation alone, how much does pairing a photon beam extend the
performance envelope? All of the data necessary to demonstrate the
performance of a dual-beam detection system, based on the idealized
fundamental model and surrogate cargos, can be accomplished with the
detection library previously established.

To reiterate, detection system performance is estimated using a figure-of-merit
(Fs) as a function of the empirically determined average noise background
measured at T >> 40 seconds post-irradiation (see Models and Methods). The
primary time integrated signal(s) for the calculation of Fs are determined over the
period of 7-40 seconds post-irradiation (34 seconds total). The Fs threshold
values for good, diminishing and unreliable system operation are based on
DNDO performance requirements of a maximum false negative rate of 1.67%
and 0.5% maximum false positive rate. Values calculated for Fs can be generally
categorized for this system as:


Fs ≥ 5, good system performance (meets DNDO goals)



5 > Fs > 2, declining system performance (increasing false alarm rates)



Fs ≤ 2, poor system performance (unreliable)
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By definition, the DNDO performance requirements do not guarantee threat
target detection. On the other hand, Fs values somewhat less than five do not
necessarily preclude acceptable system performance (Pd ≥ 0.95) if higher false
positive rates are tolerated (Figure 17).

Simulated detection system performances for the threat target in Celotex,
aluminum, clay and iron over a mean background range of 10-10000 counts/sec
are illustrated in Figures 43 through 50. Following previous convention, the
“default” plot is produced from dual-beam simulations and the neutron beam
interrogation results are noted in the chart title. Dashed lines at Fs = 5 (green,
meets DNDO goals) and Fs = 2 (red, unreliable) demarcate the diminishing, but
potentially useful, system performance area (yellow). Active backgrounds
measured from experiment ranged from 50-5000 counts/sec, so a functional
threshold of 50 counts/sec is appropriate as well (Slaughter et al., 2007a).
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A.

Celotex

System performance using neutron beam interrogation with Celotex is shown in
Figure 43. The neutron beam alone is sufficient to meet Fs ≥ 5 at ρ ≤ 0.3 g/cc
(purple curve) for backgrounds up to 10000 counts/sec, and good performance is
still achieved at ρ = 0.4 g/cc at ~2400 counts/sec (green curve). The system does
not meet any detection goal at the highest density of 0.65 g/cc (bottom tan
curve). Dual-beam results are presented in Figure 44. Immediate benefit can be
seen at the highest density, as the addition of the photon beam allows good
system performance to 65 counts/sec and increases the potential performance
band by a factor of five.
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Figure 43.

Simulated detection system performance based on delayed gamma
emission (Eγ = 3-6 Mev) after 30 second interrogation with a 7 MeV
neutron beam. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in homogenized Celotex
at densities of 0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 44.

Simulated detection system performance based on delayed gamma
emission (Eγ = 3-6 Mev) after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV
neutron and 12.2 MeV photon beams. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
homogenized Celotex at densities of 0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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B.

Aluminum

System performance using neutron beam interrogation with aluminum is shown
in Figure 45. The neutron beam alone is sufficient to meet Fs ≥ 5 at ρ ≤ 0.3 g/cc
for backgrounds up to 10000 counts/sec, and good performance is still achieved
at ρ = 0.4 g/cc at ~1600 counts/sec (green curve). Again, the system does not
meet meaningful detection goals at the highest densities 0.6 of 0.65 g/cc (bottom
two curves). Dual-beam results are presented in Figure 46. Gain can be seen as
well at the highest densities, as the addition of the photon beam allows good
system performance up to ~110 counts/sec for ρ = 0.6 g/cc.
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Figure 45.

Simulated detection system performance based on delayed gamma
emission (Eγ = 3-6 Mev) after 30 second interrogation with a 7 MeV
neutron beam. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in homogenized aluminum
at densities of 0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 46.

Simulated detection system performance based on delayed gamma
emission (Eγ = 3-6 Mev) after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV
neutron and 12.2 MeV photon beams. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
homogenized aluminum at densities of 0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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C.

Clay

System performance using neutron beam interrogation with Clay is shown in
Figure 47. The neutron beam alone is sufficient to meet Fs ≥ 5 at ρ ≤ 0.3 g/cc for
backgrounds up to 10000 counts/sec, and good performance is still achieved at ρ
= 0.5 g/cc at ~1300 counts/sec (orange curve). The system meets meaningful
detection goals at the highest densities 0.6 of 0.65 g/cc at ≥ 250 counts/sec
(bottom two curves). Dual-beam results are presented in Figure 48. The addition
of the photon beam allows good system performance up to ~650 counts/sec for ρ
= 0.6 g/cc.
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Figure 47.

Simulated detection system performance based on delayed gamma
emission (Eγ = 3-6 Mev) after 30 second interrogation with a 7 MeV
neutron beam. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in homogenized clay at
densities of 0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 48.

Simulated detection system performance based on delayed gamma
emission (Eγ = 3-6 Mev) after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV
neutron and 12.2 MeV photon beams. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
homogenized clay at densities of 0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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D.

Iron

System performance using neutron beam interrogation with iron is shown in
Figure 49. The neutron beam alone is sufficient to meet Fs ≥ 5 at ρ ≤ 0.3 g/cc for
backgrounds up to 10000 counts/sec, and good performance is still achieved at ρ
= 0.4 g/cc at ~2100 counts/sec (green curve). Again, the system does not meet
meaningful detection goals at the highest density of 0.65 g/cc (bottom curve).
Dual-beam results are presented in Figure 50. Some gain can be seen, but the
photon beam still does not add enough signals for the system to meet detection
goals at the highest density.
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Figure 49.

Simulated detection system performance based on delayed gamma
emission (Eγ = 3-6 Mev) after 30 second interrogation with a 7 MeV
neutron beam. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in homogenized iron at
densities of 0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 50.

Simulated detection system performance based on delayed gamma
emission (Eγ = 3-6 Mev) after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV
neutron and 12.2 MeV photon beams. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
homogenized iron at densities of 0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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E.

Summary

The delayed gamma signal produced by neutron beam interrogation met the
figure-of-merit goal of Fs ≥ 5 in all four materials at average densities up to 0.3
g/cc. This finding indicates that neutron beam interrogation alone may be
sufficient to confirm the presence of SNM in this system at low average densities,
regardless of Z, at active background levels ≤ 10,000 counts/sec. This covers
80% of all container traffic and could allow for the application of the ALARA
concept to commercial shipping without impacting container security. This could
be achieved by reducing the beam strength (neutrons/sec) or the irradiation time
(less than 30 seconds).

All four sets of figures clearly demonstrate the positive impact of pairing a 12.2
MeV photon beam with an interrogating 7 MeV neutron beam on detection
system performance at ρ > 0.3 g/cc. The photon beam not only shifts but extends
the potentially acceptable performance zone for each density to the right
improving the possibility that folding outside information can assist in meeting
system performance objectives at increased levels of mean background.
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DISCUSSION

I.

Fundamental Model and Code Suite

A.

Fundamental Model

This work has successfully demonstrated that 8’ cubes are reasonable
interrogation volumes for modeling. The “Nuclear Car Wash” design anticipated
driving entire containers through a neutron beam. This may not be necessary, or
even preferred, when considering the amount of avoidable active background
produced, ALARA concerns over the container contents, or inadvertent exposure
of stowaways (ANSI, 2007). The fundamental model prescribes stationary
interrogation of a specific section determined by folding x-ray images, shipping
manifest information and other pertinent data into the decision process. The
container would be transported into the interrogation portal on a conveyer
system, much like that used for air cargo (ULD) screening.

B.

Code Suite

The code suite was implemented as described in Martin, 2012, with minor insuite post processing modifications as requested to ease interpretation of the
output. Fission product yields were not available in the existing CINDER library
for thorium-232 and were substituted using protactinium-232. On a humorous
note, we had not anticipated the case where CINDER supplied zero gamma flux
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results to MCNPX, resulting in a program crash. This occurs when no decay
gamma-rays are created, as in the cases of the Celotex and clay surrogates
without the threat target.

II.

Model Implementation

A.

Linearity

The preliminary data collected indicates a strong linear (semi-logarithmic)
relationship between the homogenized density of the cargo and the number of
delayed gammas exiting the surrogate container. This behavior was anticipated
and touched upon in Pruet et al., 2005, and may have a positive impact on the
ability to predict performance given lower (or higher) beam source strengths
(particles/sec). Over the density range involved, it is conceivable that one would
only need to ascertain the slopes of the lines for various homogenized materials
at fixed beam energies to be able to make accurate predictions of delayed
gamma production for differing source strengths from a given target.

B.

Target Detection

Due to the unique nature of delayed gamma-ray emission, the beam energies
used and their strengths (5 x 108 particles/sec at cargo surface), the modeled
system here would certainly identify this uranium oxide target as a potential SNM
threat. This statement is further reinforced when considering that the method
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used to determine Fs is very conservative. Finally, the beam strengths
anticipated for a deployed system would be substantially higher, perhaps 10 9
particles/sec or more. Increased photon beam energy is also possible using
bremsstrahlung sources.

III.

Dual-Beam Interrogation

A.

Additivity of Beam Results

One can assume simple additivity for interrogation results when beams are
applied separately for this system. An example using the very low density
aluminum surrogate is tabulated in Tables 3, 4 and 5. The signals created by
each beam are essentially independent and amenable to simple addition with
regard to the figure-of-merit (Fs) calculation using this threat target and
homogenized cargos over the density range of 0.05-0.65 g/cc. Further analysis of
the cross production of (n,f) and (γ,f) produced by the beams in the target proper
support this observation:


Dual-beam: (n,f) = 13690/cc-sec, (γ,f) = 2503/cc-sec



Neutron beam: (n,f) = 13640/cc-sec, (γ,f) = 0.1545/cc-sec



Photon beam: (n,f) = 48.37/cc-sec, (γ,f) = 2503/cc-sec

The fission (γ,f) contribution is trivial as E < 8 MeV for gamma-rays associated
with fission (Maienschein et al., 1958). Follow on (n,f) from photofission yields an
increase in the overall rate of just 0.35% to the dual-beam case – not enough to
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significantly alter delayed gamma emission as witnessed. This is an important
consideration lending itself to the possibility of estimating the contribution from
photon beam interrogation when system performance falls into the marginal, or
informative, yellow zone after neutron interrogation alone. There should be
comparatively little addition to the active background (photonuclear reactions
other than photofission appear to contribute little to the active background and
are ignored when determining σ). The figure-of-merit could then be estimated
assuming the presence of SNM and a determination made as to whether or not
the additional delayed gamma signal would cross the threshold for reliable
system performance. If not, then an unnecessary irradiation would be avoided
and other avenues, such as removal of a portion of the container’s contents
followed by intensive passive scanning, may be employed.
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Table 3: Delayed Gamma Tally, 3-4 MeV

Time (sec)

N

P

N+P

N&P

7

9065

1579

10644

10647

8

8325

1459

9784

9783

9

7693

1356

9050

9051

10

7148

1268

8417

8414

15

5293

962

6255

6253

20

4254

788

5042

5039

25

3600

676

4276

4276

30

3146

596

3742

3742

35

2805

535

3340

3338

40

2533

486

3018

3018

Delayed gamma current (E = 3-4 MeV) through one vertical side of surrogate
container cube at one second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second
intervals from 10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
(N), 12.2 MeV photon (P) or both (N & P) beams. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
homogenized aluminum at a density of 0.05 g/cc.
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Table 4: Delayed Gamma Tally, 4-5 MeV

Time (sec)

N

P

N+P

N&P

7

2726

496

3222

3223

8

2537

465

3003

3005

9

2374

438

2812

2813

10

2232

414

2647

2648

15

1721

327

2049

2050

20

1423

276

1699

1700

25

1232

242

1474

1475

30

1100

217

1317

1318

35

999

198

1197

1199

40

918

183

1101

1102

Delayed gamma current (E = 4-5 MeV) through one vertical side of surrogate
container cube at one second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second
intervals from 10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
(N), 12.2 MeV photon (P) or both (N & P) beams. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
homogenized aluminum at a density of 0.05 g/cc.
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Table 5: Delayed Gamma Tally, 5-6 MeV

Time (sec)

N

P

N+P

N&P

7

1031

197

1228

1228

8

937

180

1117

1118

9

854

165

1019

1020

10

782

152

934

934

15

532

106

639

639

20

397

82

478

478

25

322

67

389

390

30

275

59

334

333

35

244

53

296

296

40

221

48

269

268

Delayed gamma current (E = 5-6 MeV) through one vertical side of surrogate
container cube at one second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second
intervals from 10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
(N), 12.2 MeV photon (P) or both (N & P) beams. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
homogenized aluminum at a density of 0.05 g/cc.
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B.

Photon Beam Contribution

In all cases, the addition of the 12.2 MeV interrogating photon beam increased
the number of delayed gammas tallied. As expected, the relative increase from
the neutron beam experiments declined with increasing Z as the photon beam
was more highly attenuated. The increased attenuation led to fewer photons
being transported at a reduced average energy to the target, and consequently
generating fewer photofission events. The Celotex case exhibited the most
improvement, at the highest densities, as the photon beam doubled the delayed
gamma signal demonstrating the benefit of the additional photon beam in a
hydrogenous low Z cargo. Clay is a transitional material in this respect. A
summary of beam contribution ratios is provided in Table 6 for Celotex,
aluminum, clay and iron. For dual-beam interrogation of the threat target in air,
the neutron beam contributes 85% to the delayed gamma signal versus 15% by
the photon beam. A visual explanation of Table 6 is shown in Figure 51.
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Table 6: Contribution of Neutron vs. Photon Beam to the Total Delayed
Gamma Signal
(Percentage per neutron/photon beam)

Density (g/cc)

Celotex
Z≈4
(%)

Aluminum
Z = 13
(%)

Clay
Z≈7
(%)

Iron
Z = 26
(%)

0.05

81/19

84/16

84/16

85/15

0.1

78/22

83/17

81/19

85/15

0.2

77/23

79/21

77/23

84/16

0.3

76/24

76/24

77/23

83/17

0.4

71/29

72/28

78/22

82/18

0.5

65/35

67/33

80/20

82/18

0.6

55/45

63/37

82/18

81/19

0.65

49/51

61/39

82/18

81/19

Individual beam contributions (neutron/photon) to cumulative delayed gamma
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Figure 51.

Smoothed beam contributions to cumulative delayed gamma signal
after interrogation with 7 MeV neutron and 12.2 MeV photon
beams. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in homogenized Celotex,
aluminum, clay or iron at densities of 0.05-0.65 g/cc.
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C.

Teflon

Fluorine is an excellent mask, even though it is easily identified from the
nitrogen-16 decay gamma spectrum it produces. The reason is the large, flat
signal created in the detector for E < 5 MeV. Very little fluorine-19 is needed to
generate enough noise to render any signal-to-noise (S/N) measurement in this
type of scintillator inconclusive, and it is doubtful that subtracting this noise
source could be done reliably. This can be addressed if a single photon beam is
used as nitrogen-16 would not be created. Oddly enough, if fluorinated materials
were used to attempt to mask SNM signals from neutron interrogation, they may
act as an amplifier when photofission is induced. The average energy of fission
neutrons is ~2 MeV, which is at the threshold energy for fluorine-19 activation
(see Table 2).

IV.

On-Site Modeling

The delayed gamma current results were produced in very reasonable clock
times on a laptop computer. A rapid method could be developed to anticipate a
detector response from interrogating an 8’ section of a shipping container. Below
is a trial procedure for modeling a container on-site:

1. Obtain the manifest, net weight and a coarse x-ray of the container
contents.
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2. Segment the cargo and homogenize, if feasible, based on Zavg (paper,
aluminum, brick, steel, etc.); if not, use as few homogenized MCNPX
macrobodies as possible (cubes, spheres, etc.).
3. An example of macrobody use would be a challenging cargo such as a car
(Figure 52). The engine compartment could be modeled as a cube of
medium-high density iron with the balance of the car volume homogenized
and presented as a rectangular parallelepiped of low density aluminum.
4. The operator only needs a look-up to define the material Z category based
on the manifest.
5. Use rigging/hoisting techniques to determine density estimates of each
segment/macrobody (Figure 53).
6. Each segment follows the 8' x 8' x 8' model = 0.4 TEU.
7. Prior information gathered on the container history and contents should
limit scanning to one or two segments.
8. If the whole container requires scanning, then a 40' container is divided
into five segments and a 20' container is divided into two segments
(ignoring the 2' on each end; in fact, anything < 4').
9. Locate a DNDO threat object in the center of mass of each segment.
10. Approximately 106 Monte Carlo histories for all particles should be
sufficient to achieve one significant figure in the delayed gamma current
result.
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11. Model using a photon beam alone if fluorine-19 is suspected.
12. Look at the Eγ = 3-6 MeV current and multiply by 0.3 for a PVT detector
estimate.
13. Now have an idea of the detector response prior to actual interrogation, if
something is really there.
14. Inject this information into the decision process to reduce uncertainty in
clearing (or condemning) the container.

The resources necessary to deploy an active interrogation system at a port would
be considerable, $1 million+, using the passive Advanced Spectroscopic Portal
(ASP) program target of $822,000 per installed system as a benchmark (GSN,
2011). The computational hardware requirement for fast modeling should be
financially practicable and defensible if unnecessary interrogations can be
avoided.
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Figure 52.

What about when general homogenization is not feasible (from
Reed, 2007)?
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Figure 53.

Load weight estimation reference example for use in determining

the density of MCNPX macrobodies when general homogenization is not feasible
(from WRRC, 1990).
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V.

Uncertainty Quantification

The ability to computationally model a proposed particle interrogation system for
detecting SNM requires a comprehensive assessment of both the probabilistic
and non-probabilistic uncertainties involved. The interest lies in the ability to
achieve realism and to inject the additional information gleaned from these
computational models into the overall container security decision chain.

A.

Reducing σ

Reducing the value of the standard deviation term, σ, in the Fs calculation is
critical. The conservative approach applied, artificially doubling σ, attempts to
bound the variations encountered in actual background measurements likely
leading to an under-valuation of true system performance in an ideal model.
Systematically shrinking σ would be accomplished by identifying and minimizing
the sources of uncertainty associated with the mean experimental background
measurement, such as instrumentation drift, line voltage noise or changes in
ambient temperature, more effectively linking the model to the proposed system.
This is a continuous improvement process that begins by establishing an
“uncertainty inventory.” This inventory is an accounting of the various kinds of
uncertainties involved, ranging from irreducible random noise to reducible lackof-knowledge (Langenbrunner et al., 2008). The inventory includes a review of
the data available and devising ideas for how this information may be quantified
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and used to provide estimates for each uncertainty relevant to improving the
predictive capability of computational models for active interrogation systems.

B.

Cargo Composition

A major leap in detection chain efficiency is realized if only the mass of the cargo
and its approximate distribution in the container were required for the
interrogation process to determine the presence of SNM. This can be
approached

through

forward

uncertainty

propagation,

or

“propagating

uncertainties through simulation models using varying parameter settings” (Lin et
al., 2012). In fact, this has been carried out to some extent by changing cargo
compositions in the fundamental model while all other aspects remained fixed.

Limited analyses of dual-beam computational experiments were piloted using the
maximal information-based nonparametric exploration (MINE) statistical package
(Reshef et al., 2011). This novel toolkit provides an avenue to identify and
explore associations and relationships in the data that are not well modeled by a
function through determination of a maximal information coefficient (MIC). The
MIC is founded on mutual information, a general measure of dependence
between a pair of random variables, initially outlined by Linfoot (1957). In Table
7, MINE is applied to the five material comparison of the delayed gamma current
work to exercise the tool and confirm the linear behavior observed in Figure 27.
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Table 7: MINE Statistics Example

MIC - Maximal Information Coefficient
MAS – Maximum Asymmetry Score
MEV – Maximum Edge Value
MCN – Minimum Cell Number

An example applying the MINE statistical package to confirm some linear
properties initially observed in the five material comparisons of Figure 27.
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Reshef provides a chart of MINE statistics calculated for some ideal sample
associations:



Maximal Information Coefficient (MIC) = relationship strength



Maximum Asymmetry Score (MAS) = departure from monotonicity



Maximum Edge Value (MEV) = closeness to being a function



Minimum Cell Number (MCN) = complexity

Detailed explanation of each measure is beyond the scope of this simple
example; it is sufficient to know that an MIC approaching unity is an indicator of a
strong relationship between the cargo density and delayed gamma current for
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each material. A comparison of the MINE output in Table 7 to the top line of the
chart confirms the linear properties observed in the dual-beam current results.

The next logical application is to compare the delayed gamma results from each
material in a series of stepped densities between the cargo wall and threat target,
gradually moving away from homogeneity.

Evaluating a complex series of

simulations in this fashion, but still maintaining ρ = 0.05-0.65 g/cc within each
step, establishes a basis from which to judge the strength of the association
between cargos. This would be principally useful with regard to neutron
interrogation because clumpy cargos can be substantially more attenuating than
homogeneous ones.

C.

4-Box Approach

With a library of dual-beam simulation results using relevant test objects,
attainable sources and general categories of homogenized cargos established,
how could this information be incorporated into an evaluation of the entire
container security system? One method under investigation is the 4-box
approach (Figure 54).
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Figure 54.

The 4-box approach depicting various descriptions and contents of
each box and the six inference connections (from de Oliveira et al.,
2011).
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The 4-box approach is a tool to quantify “inference uncertainty.”

Inference

uncertainty is produced when deriving a conclusion about something that is
unmeasured or unattainable based on what is known at the time. The 4-box
approach is a vehicle that integrates the knowledge available and quantifies and
aggregates the various uncertainties involved (Langenbrunner et al., 2008; 2009;
2010a; 2010b). The goal is to infer real world performance from experiments,
simulations and theory, particularly at the system level. The four boxes are
generally defined as follows:


The Red Box is the system or problem of interest, which has insufficient
data to provide conclusions on its own and must be supported,
supplemented, or augmented by the data, knowledge and information
contained in the other boxes. This could be the SNM detection success
rate for a deployed active interrogation system scanning a container
stuffed with consumer electronics.



The Gold Box contains the calculations or high fidelity computational
models corresponding closely to the Red Box application of interest. The
level of computation will generally be very expensive.



The Green Box is a sub-scale, sub-system or analogous version of the
Red Box problem. The “Nuclear Car Wash” work conducted at LLNL is a
good example of an experimental campaign that falls within this box.
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The Blue Box includes theory, first principles, historical records and
knowledge elicited from subject matter experts, and 1-D, 2-D, or simple 3D calculations or computational models. This dissertation is an excellent
example.

The data, information, and knowledge contained in the supporting boxes are
combined with that of the Red Box based on Saaty’s Analytical Hierarchy
Process for decision making (Saaty, 1980). The integration takes place at the
“box” level (from de Oliveira et al., 2011):

If the boxes contain the top or system level, then results for the integration are at
the same level. The integration methodology quantifies probabilistic and nonprobabilistic uncertainties inside each box, plus the inference uncertainties
between boxes (the arrows), to produce an integrated uncertainty value for the

147

real world application in the Red Box. Even applying the 4-box technique,
mathematical research and development work will be required to accommodate
the integration of different uncertainty theories specific to active interrogation
systems based on the uncertainty inventory.

VI.

Future Studies

A.

Other Photon Beam Energies

The code suite can be easily modified to investigate photon beam energies other
than 12.2 MeV. One beam under consideration is a 9.2 MeV monoenergetic
source, despite the lower energy, because it is below the 10 MeV x-ray energy
limit to inspect food (Moss et al., 2006; FDA, 2001). Another beam could be
modeled from a 30 MeV end-point bremsstrahlung source that yields, according
to Figure 5, a nearly ideal 14.7 MeV average energy (Jacobs et al., 1979).
Neutron beam energy is essentially capped at 10 MeV because of neutron
activation issues but energies < 10 MeV, or a spectrum, would be easy to
institute as well.

B.

Phosphogypsum

Phosphogypsum (CaSO4 • 2H2O) is a by-product created during the manufacture
of phosphoric acid by reacting phosphate ore (apatite) with sulfuric acid. Some
phosphate ores can be highly radioactive, and contaminants like radium, uranium
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and thorium wind up in this synthetic gypsum rendering it largely useless (Table
1). This characteristic, combined with an intermediate Zavg and ease of
acquisition, make it a potentially interesting masking and shielding material for
defeating passive and/or active scanning. Reproducing a data set like that done
for clay would be time consuming, but not complicated, again demonstrating the
flexibility of the fundamental model and code suite.

C.

Exploiting Poor Data

The figure-of-merit (Fs) determination for system performance is based on
cumulative detector counts in an energy window over a fixed time:

where,
S = delayed gamma signal from interrogation
σ = expression for standard deviation term

Can the figure-of-merit be modified to reflect “poor” information? Preferably the
focus would be on modifying the numerator, making a direct addition to the signal
without substantively affecting the complex standard deviation term. Any
improvement to Fs (e.g. 3 → 3.5) using the data already collected (good, bad or

149

indeterminate) from the interrogation would be excellent. It may take the form of
a simple weighting factor:

with ω as a function of the observed decay rate at T < 6 seconds post-irradiation,
or a measure of Eγ < 3 MeV, where short-lived low energy activation products
make SNM-derived delayed gamma signal counting unreliable. A set of
experiments could be devised using a threat target that initially results in Fs very
near some target threshold using the original method. Careful examination of the
poor data may reveal a reliable trend that would allow a fractional increase in S.

VII.

Conclusion

Active interrogation is a powerful tool worth the expense and complexity if
confidence in the results is high. When applied to the search for special nuclear
material in shipping containers, limiting false positives reduces the overall
expenditure on security and the impact on the speed of commerce. On the other
hand, eliminating false negatives implies absolute discovery and “the net cost to
protect the country from a WMD [Weapon of Mass Destruction] arriving in a
container could be negligible” (Bjorkholm and Boeh, 2006).
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The intention of this dissertation is to provide practical engineering information
and techniques for use in the design and operation of proposed active
interrogation portals or related applications. This research has added the
following to the active interrogation knowledge base:


A systematic method to evaluate containers using a novel code suite.



A dual-beam model incorporating photons and neutrons for active
interrogation.



A body of Monte Carlo results applying the method to evaluate the model
and ascertain the efficacy of a photon beam in applicable materials.

The results produced lead to these primary findings:


Dual-beam interrogation produces a superior delayed gamma-ray signal to
neutron beam interrogation in all cases.



Neutron beam interrogation alone may be sufficient for cargos of average
density < 0.3 g/cc.



Only a general idea of cargo composition may be needed to effectively
model a threat.

151

The addition of a photon beam to an active interrogation portal should provide
the following advantages:


Photonuclear reactions other than photofission contribute little to the
active background. Fluorinated cargo is a key example.



12.2 MeV photons demonstrate superior penetration in hydrogenous
materials.



Neutron beam production and shielding concerns make photon beam
interrogation and attractive addition.



ALARA neutron dose considerations to commercial cargo can be reduced
if photon beam interrogation can serve as a supplement (subject to its own
legal limitations).



In limited cases, such as encountering fluorinated cargo, if system
performance requirements are relaxed (i.e. an increase in the false alarm
rate is tolerated) photon interrogation alone may be sufficient to
adequately scan and clear a container.

The ability to computationally assess every conceivable container/threat scenario
is not currently possible. In the meantime, the careful application of well thoughtout, simplifying assumptions to the issue of container security can transform the
computer from an adding machine into an “intelligence amplifier” (Weinberg,
1972). In conjunction with data mining devices like MINE, and innovative
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uncertainty quantification methods like the 4-box approach, powerful tools are
available for exploring (and exploiting) the information from active interrogation
research using only modest computational resources. The author has gained
many insights by taking a system view of the shipping container industry as a
whole and will apply these lessons from the “science of simplification” to future
research, regardless of the field.
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APPENDIX A

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in Air

154

Figure 55.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in air at
0.001275 g/cc (ISA).
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Figure 56.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in air at 0.001275 g/cc
(ISA).
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Figure 57.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in air at 0.001275 g/cc
(ISA).
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APPENDIX B

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in Celotex
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B1.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.05 g/cc Celotex

Figure 58.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
Celotex at 0.05 g/cc.
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Figure 59.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.05 g/cc.
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Figure 60.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.05 g/cc.
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B2.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.1 g/cc Celotex

Figure 61.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
Celotex at 0.1 g/cc.
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Figure 62.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.1 g/cc.
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Figure 63.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.1 g/cc.
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B3.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.2 g/cc Celotex

Figure 64.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
Celotex at 0.2 g/cc.
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Figure 65.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.2 g/cc.
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Figure 66.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.2 g/cc.
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B4.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.3 g/cc Celotex

Figure 67.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
Celotex at 0.3 g/cc.
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Figure 68.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.3 g/cc.
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Figure 69.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.3 g/cc.
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B5.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.4 g/cc Celotex

Figure 70.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
Celotex at 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 71.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 72.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.4 g/cc.
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B6.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.5 g/cc Celotex

Figure 73.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
Celotex at 0.5 g/cc.
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Figure 74.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.5 g/cc.
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Figure 75.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.5 g/cc.
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B7.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.6 g/cc Celotex

Figure 76.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
Celotex at 0.6 g/cc.
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Figure 77.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.6 g/cc.
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Figure 78.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.6 g/cc.
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B8.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.65 g/cc Celotex

Figure 79.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
Celotex at 0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 80.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 81.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in Celotex at 0.65 g/cc.
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APPENDIX C

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in Aluminum
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C1.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.05 g/cc Aluminum

Figure 82.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
aluminum at 0.05 g/cc.
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Figure 83.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.05 g/cc.
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Figure 84.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.05 g/cc.
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C2.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.1 g/cc Aluminum

Figure 85.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
aluminum at 0.1 g/cc.
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Figure 86.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.1 g/cc.
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Figure 87.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.1 g/cc.
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C3.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.2 g/cc Aluminum

Figure 88.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
aluminum at 0.2 g/cc.
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Figure 89.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.2 g/cc.
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Figure 90.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.2 g/cc.
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C4.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.3 g/cc Aluminum

Figure 91.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
aluminum at 0.3 g/cc.
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Figure 92.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.3 g/cc.
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Figure 93.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.3 g/cc.
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C5.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.4 g/cc Aluminum

Figure 94.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
aluminum at 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 95.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 96.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.4 g/cc.
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C6.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.5 g/cc Aluminum

Figure 97.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
aluminum at 0.5 g/cc.
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Figure 98.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.5 g/cc.

200

Figure 99.

Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.5 g/cc.
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C7.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.6 g/cc Aluminum

Figure 100. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
aluminum at 0.6 g/cc.
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Figure 101. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.6 g/cc.
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Figure 102. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.6 g/cc.
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C8.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.65 g/cc Aluminum

Figure 103. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in
aluminum at 0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 104. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 105. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in aluminum at 0.65 g/cc.
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APPENDIX D

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in Clay
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D1.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.05 g/cc Clay

Figure 106. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay
at 0.05 g/cc.
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Figure 107. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.05 g/cc.
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Figure 108. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.05 g/cc.
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D2.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.1 g/cc Clay

Figure 109. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay
at 0.1 g/cc.
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Figure 110. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.1 g/cc.
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Figure 111. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.1 g/cc.
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D3.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.2 g/cc Clay

Figure 112. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay
at 0.2 g/cc.
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Figure 113. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.2 g/cc.
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Figure 114. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.2 g/cc.
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D4.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.3 g/cc Clay

Figure 115. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay
at 0.3 g/cc.
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Figure 116. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.3 g/cc.
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Figure 117. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.3 g/cc.
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D5.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.4 g/cc Clay

Figure 118. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay
at 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 119. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 120. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.4 g/cc.
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D6.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.5 g/cc Clay

Figure 121. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay
at 0.5 g/cc.
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Figure 122. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.5 g/cc.
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Figure 123. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.5 g/cc.
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D7.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.6 g/cc Clay

Figure 124. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay
at 0.6 g/cc.
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Figure 125. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.6 g/cc.
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Figure 126. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.6 g/cc.
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D8.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.65 g/cc Clay

Figure 127. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay
at 0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 128. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 129. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in clay at 0.65 g/cc.
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APPENDIX E

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in Iron
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E1.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.05 g/cc Iron

Figure 130. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron
at 0.05 g/cc.
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Figure 131. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.05 g/cc.
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Figure 132. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.05 g/cc.
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E2.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.1 g/cc Iron

Figure 133. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron
at 0.1 g/cc.
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Figure 134. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.1 g/cc.

238

Figure 135. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.1 g/cc.
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E3.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.2 g/cc Iron

Figure 136. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron
at 0.2 g/cc.
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Figure 137. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.2 g/cc.
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Figure 138. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.2 g/cc.
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E4.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.3 g/cc Iron

Figure 139. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron
at 0.3 g/cc.
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Figure 140. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.3 g/cc.
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Figure 141. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.3 g/cc.
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E5.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.4 g/cc Iron

Figure 142. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron
at 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 143. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.4 g/cc.
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Figure 144. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.4 g/cc.
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E6.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.5 g/cc Iron

Figure 145. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron
at 0.5 g/cc.
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Figure 146. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.5 g/cc.

250

Figure 147. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.5 g/cc.
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E7.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.6 g/cc Iron

Figure 148. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron
at 0.6 g/cc.
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Figure 149. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.6 g/cc.
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Figure 150. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.6 g/cc.
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E8.

Simulated Detector Responses with U3O8 Target in 0.65 g/cc Iron

Figure 151. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
and 12.2 MeV photon beams. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical
side of surrogate container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron
at 0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 152. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 7 MeV neutron
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.65 g/cc.
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Figure 153. Simulated detector response to delayed gamma emission at one
second intervals from 7-10 seconds and five second intervals from
10-40 seconds after 30 second interrogation with 12.2 MeV photon
beam. PVT detector adjacent to one vertical side of surrogate
container cube. Rapiscan Test Object “E” in iron at 0.65 g/cc.
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APPENDIX F

From ET, 2012.
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APPENDIX G

Sample Input Decks – U3O8 Target in 0.1 g/cc Aluminum
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G1.

TINDER Input Deck

&input
cinderexec= 'cinder2008',
debug=0,
transexec= './tinder_mcnpx_act.pl',
ngrps= 66,
ggrps= 25,
burnlibn= "/usr/local/cinder/CINDER2008/Data/C08lib_fission",
burnlibg= "/usr/local/cinder/CINDER2008/Data/C08lib_gamma_0K",
burnlibgl = "/usr/local/cinder/CINDER2008/Data/cindergl.dat",
burnlocin="/home/rlkeith/work/cinder/",
spectraFile="spectra_l"
/
&materials
umix
u-235 2350920 8.710941E-04
u-238 2380920 3.536092E-03
o-16 160080 1.175411E-02

&burnup
calculation="u3o8 puck in aluminum",
volcc=2.92075E+02,
flxmlt=5e8,
flosig=1.000e-21,
signif=1.000e-21,
epsm=0,
epsn=0,
exponmax=0,
kchn=0,
klib=0,
nfe=2,
ltsdnz=-1,
nlintl=0,
nosame=0,
gasopt=1,
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run_tab=1,
suffix="",
fine_dg=1000,
coarse_dg=10000,
fine_dn=1000,
coarse_dn=10000,
flxmltg=5e8,
nfeg=2,
description="u3o8 puck",
fluxname="tally 14",
gfluxname="tally 24",
ncamp = 11
/
1 1.0 1.0
30.0 's'
2 0.0E+00 0.0
6.0 's'
-7.0 's'
1 0.0 0.0
1.0 's'
1 0.0 0.0
1.0 's'
1 0.0 0.0
1.0 's'
1 0.0 0.0
5.0 's'
1 0.0 0.0
5.0 's'
1 0.0 0.0
5.0 's'
1 0.0 0.0
5.0 's'
1 0.0 0.0
5.0 's'
1 0.0 0.0
5.0 's'
/
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G2.

MCNPX.X1 Neutron Beam Input Deck

Test Object E (U3O8 disk) surrounded by low density aluminum
C Cell Cards
1 1 -2.05 -1
imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ target
2 2 -0.1
1 -2 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ L-density
3 3 -7.82
2 -3 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ 4.76mm (3/16") of c-steel
4 0
3 imp:n=0 imp:p=0
C
1
2
3

Surface Cards
RCC 0 -1.27 0 0 2.54 0 6.05 $ 600g total mass
RPP -121.524 121.524 -121.524 121.524 -121.524 121.524
RPP -122.0 122.0 -122.0 122.0 -122.0 122.0 $ cm - 8x8x8 ft

C Data Cards
m1 92235 0.0539 92238 0.2188 8016 0.7273 $ 19.75% enriched
m2 13027 1.0 $ aluminum
m3 6000 -0.005 26000 -0.995 $ wall
MODE N P
F14:N 1
c
C 66 group CINDER2008g neutron energy group structure
E14 1.0000E-11 5.0000E-10 1.0000E-09 2.0000E-09 5.0000E-09 1.0000E-08 &
1.5000E-08 2.0000E-08 2.5000E-08 3.0000E-08 3.5000E-08 4.2000E-08 &
5.0000E-08 5.8000E-08 6.7000E-08 8.0000E-08 1.0000E-07 1.5200E-07 &
2.5100E-07 4.1400E-07 6.8300E-07 1.1250E-06 1.8550E-06 3.0590E-06 &
5.0430E-06 8.3150E-06 1.3710E-05 2.2600E-05 3.7270E-05 6.1440E-05 &
1.0130E-04 1.6700E-04 2.7540E-04 4.5400E-04 7.4850E-04 1.2340E-03 &
2.0350E-03 2.4040E-03 2.8400E-03 3.3550E-03 5.5310E-03 9.1190E-03 &
1.5030E-02 1.9890E-02 2.5540E-02 4.0870E-02 6.7380E-02 1.1110E-01 &
1.8320E-01 3.0200E-01 3.8870E-01 4.9790E-01 6.39279E-01 8.2085E-01 &
1.10803E+00 1.35335E+00 1.73774E+00 2.23130E+00 2.86505E+00 &
3.67879E+00 4.96585E+00 6.06500E+00 1.00000E+01 1.49182E+01 &
1.69046E+01 2.00000E+01 2.50000E+01
C
F24:P 1
c
C 25 group CINDER gamma energy group structure
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E24 1.00e-03 1.00e-02 3.00e-02 6.00e-02 1.00e-01 2.00e-01 &
3.00e-01 5.00e-01 5.250e-01 7.500e-01 1.0 1.330 1.660 &
2.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 12.0 17.0 30.0
C
F11:P 3.1
c
C 2.6-7 MeV Check
E11 2.6 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 30.0
C
VOL j 14.3574e6 2j $ cargo volume
C 7 MeV neutron source
c This is for initial irradiation transport step
{SRC1:SDEF SUR=3.4 POS=0 -122.0 0 AXS=0 1 0 RAD=D1 PAR=1 ERG=7.0 VEC=0 1 0 DIR=1
SI1 0 6.05
SP1 -21 1}
c This is for any other re-transport step
{SRC2:SDEF CEL=1 PAR=2 ERG=d3
si3 [ERG]
sp3 [SRC] }
PHYS:N 25.0 2j -1 j 5
PHYS:P 30.0 2j -1 2j 1
NPS 1.4e7
PRINT
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G3.

MCNPX.X2 Photon Beam/Re-Transport Input Deck

Test Object E (U3O8 disk) surrounded by low density aluminum
C Cell Cards
1 1 -2.05 -1
imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ target
2 2 -0.1
1 -2 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ L-density
3 3 -7.82 2 -3 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ 4.76mm (3/16") of c-steel
4 4 -1.023 3 -4 imp:n=1 imp:p=1 $ plastic scintillator
5 0
4 imp:n=0 imp:p=0
C
1
2
3
4

Surface Cards
RCC 0 -1.27 0 0 2.54 0 6.05 $ 600g total mass
RPP -121.524 121.524 -121.524 121.524 -121.524 121.524
RPP -122.0 122.0 -122.0 122.0 -122.0 122.0 $ cm - 8x8x8 ft
RPP -122.0 147.4 -122.0 122.0 -122.0 122.0 $ 10" thick detector

C Data Cards
m1 92235 0.0539 92238 0.2188 8016 0.7273 $ 19.75% enriched
m2 13027 1.0 $ aluminum
m3 6000 -0.005 26000 -0.995 $ wall
m4 1001 -0.0841 6000 -0.9159 $ EJ-200 PVT detector
{SRC1:MODE N P}
{SRC2:MODE P}
F14:N 1
c
C 66 group CINDER2008g neutron energy group structure
E14 1.0000E-11 5.0000E-10 1.0000E-09 2.0000E-09 5.0000E-09 1.0000E-08 &
1.5000E-08 2.0000E-08 2.5000E-08 3.0000E-08 3.5000E-08 4.2000E-08 &
5.0000E-08 5.8000E-08 6.7000E-08 8.0000E-08 1.0000E-07 1.5200E-07 &
2.5100E-07 4.1400E-07 6.8300E-07 1.1250E-06 1.8550E-06 3.0590E-06 &
5.0430E-06 8.3150E-06 1.3710E-05 2.2600E-05 3.7270E-05 6.1440E-05 &
1.0130E-04 1.6700E-04 2.7540E-04 4.5400E-04 7.4850E-04 1.2340E-03 &
2.0350E-03 2.4040E-03 2.8400E-03 3.3550E-03 5.5310E-03 9.1190E-03 &
1.5030E-02 1.9890E-02 2.5540E-02 4.0870E-02 6.7380E-02 1.1110E-01 &
1.8320E-01 3.0200E-01 3.8870E-01 4.9790E-01 6.39279E-01 8.2085E-01 &
1.10803E+00 1.35335E+00 1.73774E+00 2.23130E+00 2.86505E+00 &
3.67879E+00 4.96585E+00 6.06500E+00 1.00000E+01 1.49182E+01 &
1.69046E+01 2.00000E+01 2.50000E+01
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C
F24:P 1
c
C 25 group CINDER gamma energy group structure
E24 1.00e-03 1.00e-02 3.00e-02 6.00e-02 1.00e-01 2.00e-01 &
3.00e-01 5.00e-01 5.250e-01 7.500e-01 1.0 1.330 1.660 &
2.0 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 12.0 17.0 30.0
C
F11:P 3.1
{SRC2:FM11 [SRCTOT]}
c
C 2.6-7 MeV Check
E11 2.6 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 30.0
c
C Detector
{SRC2:F18:P 4
E18 0 1e-5 2.0 99i 7.0 30.0}
c
C Gaussian Energy Broadening is FWHM=0.35 MeV per Knoll
{SRC2:FT18 GEB 0.35 0 0 }
C
VOL j 14.3574e6 3j $ cargo volume
C 12.2 MeV photon source
c This is for initial irradiation transport step
{SRC1:SDEF SUR=3.4 POS=0 -122.0 0 AXS=0 1 0 RAD=D1 PAR=2 ERG=12.2 VEC=0 1 0
DIR=1
SI1 0 6.05
SP1 -21 1}
c This is for any other re-transport step
{SRC2:SDEF CEL=1 PAR=2 ERG=d3
si3 [ERG]
sp3 [SRC] }
PHYS:N 25.0 2j -1 j 5
PHYS:P 30.0 2j -1 2j 1
NPS 6.3e7
PRINT
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